Wilson v. Wilson: The Effect of QDROs on Appealing Divorce Decrees by Dean, Joshua A.
The University of Akron
IdeaExchange@UAkron
Akron Law Review Akron Law Journals
June 2015
Wilson v. Wilson: The Effect of QDROs on
Appealing Divorce Decrees
Joshua A. Dean
Please take a moment to share how this work helps you through this survey. Your feedback will be
important as we plan further development of our repository.
Follow this and additional works at: http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Elder Law Commons, and the First Amendment
Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Akron Law Journals at IdeaExchange@UAkron, the
institutional repository of The University of Akron in Akron, Ohio, USA. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Akron Law Review by an authorized administrator of IdeaExchange@UAkron. For more information, please
contact mjon@uakron.edu, uapress@uakron.edu.
Recommended Citation
Dean, Joshua A. (2009) "Wilson v. Wilson: The Effect of QDROs on Appealing Divorce Decrees," Akron Law
Review: Vol. 42 : Iss. 2 , Article 8.
Available at: http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol42/iss2/8
13-DEAN_PUB_EDITS.DOC 4/14/2009 1:31 PM 
 
639 
 
WILSON V. WILSON: THE EFFECT OF QDROS ON 
APPEALING DIVORCE DECREES 
Joshua A. Dean 
 I. Introduction ....................................................................... 639 
 II. Background ........................................................................ 646 
A.   Evolution of the Law .................................................. 647 
B.   Types of Pension Plans Covered by ERISA ............... 652 
C.   Treatment of the Law .................................................. 655 
 III. Appealing a Divorce Decree .............................................. 660 
A.   Appealable Orders ...................................................... 660 
B.   Ohio’s Split on QDROs .............................................. 664 
 IV. Wilson v. Wilson ............................................................... 668 
 V. Ramifications of Wilson v. Wilson ................................... 673 
 VI. Conclusion ......................................................................... 678 
I.  INTRODUCTION  
In most divorces today, the largest asset held by the divorcing 
couple is a retirement fund belonging to one of the spouses.1  Courts in 
 
 1. Mark S. Maddox & Margaret K. Cassidy, Division of Employee Benefits Upon Divorce: 
An Analysis of the Retirement Equity Act of 1984 and a Framework of Distribution of Benefits, 58 
OHIO BAR 436, 436 (1985) (stating that in most divorces, “the pension rights or employee benefits 
of one or both spouses are the most significant marital assets owned by the couple.  Accordingly, 
employee benefits are increasingly subject to division in state divorce proceedings.”).  See also 
Jessica Straub, Note, Erb v. Erb: A Step Toward Clarification in Public Pension Division, 33 U. 
TOL. L. REV. 915, 916 (2002) (stating that pensions earned during marriage are usually marital 
property and are crucial in divorce because the pension is often the largest marital asset, along with 
the marital home); Hilary Greer Fike, Qualified Pension Trends and Divorce Considerations, 14 
AM. J. FAM. L. 234, 234-35 (2000) (stating that pensions provide the largest block of private capital 
in the country and the Federal Reserve estimated that twenty five percent of financial assets in the 
United States were held in pensions, and that the average American couple has a pension worth as 
much as their home); David L. Baumer & J.C. Poindexter, Women and Divorce:  The Perils of 
Pension Division, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 203, 203-04 (1996) (stating that for most couples, the most 
valuable assets they own are the family home and their pension plan or plans); Dylan A. Wilde, 
Student Article, Obtaining an Equitable Distribution of Retirement Plans in a Divorce Proceeding, 
1
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every state must decide how to divide a married couple’s property in 
order to provide each spouse his or her proper share.2  But when there 
are no assets large enough to offset the value of the retirement pension, 
divorce courts must find a way to “equitably distribute” the proceeds of 
the plan.3  Dealing with this large asset presented problems in the past4 
as Congress sought to limit the ability to assign proceeds of retirement 
plans to anyone who was not the named beneficiary.5   
In 1974, Congress passed the Employees Retirement Income 
Security Act (ERISA)6 in an attempt to protect the employee’s right to 
 
49 S.D. L. REV. 141, 141 (2003) (stating that a U.S. Department of Labor study from 1998 indicated 
over ninety-nine million participants of private retirement plans with assets totaling over four-
trillion dollars). 
 2. Cheyañna L. Jaffke, Death, Taxes, and Now Divorce – The Dyad Expands to a Triad: 
ERISA’s Social Policy Harms Women’s Rights, 35 U.S.F. L. REV. 255, 268-69 (2001) (describing 
the two main ways that states divide property in divorce, one under the community property system, 
in which nine states treat all property obtained during the marriage as community property that is 
equally divided upon divorce and the other under the common law property system, in which 
marital property is merely equitably divided amongst spouses upon divorce, yet the question of what 
is marital property differs by state).  See also David S. Rosettenstein, The ALI Proposals and the 
Distribution of Stock Options and Restricted Stock on Divorce: The Risks of Theory Meet the 
Theory of Risk, 8 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 243, 245-46 (2002) (stating that the ALI concluded 
that most jurisdictions adopt the principle of equitable distribution of property at divorce, yet there 
were different methods of deciding which assets are subject to distribution).  Further, the author 
states that every state must decide what assets to distribute as marital property in a divorce.  Id.; 
Baumer & Poindexter, supra note 1, at 207 tbl.1 (classifying states by their respective property 
distribution methods, showing that thirty-one states used some form of equitable distribution, while 
nine states used a form of community property and ten used only alimony as of 1996). 
 3. Timothy C. Voit & James L. Parris, Fundamentals of Qualified Domestic Relations 
Orders, 12 S.C. LAW. 24, 24 (2001) (stating that a court order to distribute the present value of a 
pension is needed when “the lump-sum present value of the pension is too large to adequately offset 
the value of the pension against other assets of the marriage or when the parties to the divorce 
cannot agree on the present value of the pension in question.”). 
 4. Maddox & Cassidy, supra note 1, at 436-37 (stating that after Congress passed the 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), but before the passing of the 
Retirement Equity Act of 1984 (REA), state courts were unsure of what authority they had to divide 
pensions in favor of non-employee spouses upon divorce).  Plan administrators feared the plan 
would lose its tax exempt status if divided.  Id.  Some courts continued to divide pensions, although 
ERISA seemed to preempt any state law authorizing such division under § 514(a).  Id.  See also 
Julie Anne Barbo, Note, Ablamis v. Roper:  Preemption of the Nonemployee Spouse’s Community 
Property Rights in ERISA Pension Plans, 49 WASH & LEE L. REV. 1085, 1086-87 (1992) (stating 
that before ERISA was passed, the lack of pension regulation resulted in a lack of uniformity among 
the state laws and unstable financial plans).  After ERISA was enacted, courts were split on whether 
ERISA’s ban on assigning pension plan benefits applied to divorce decrees that gave rights to a 
pension to a non-employee spouse.  Id. at 1087. 
 5. 29 U.S.C.S. § 1056(d)(1) (Lexis 2007) (“Each pension plan shall provide that benefits 
provided under the plan may not be assigned or alienated.”). 
 6. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 
829.  See also 29 U.S.C.S. §§ 1001-1461 (Lexis 2007); Keron A. Wright, “Stuck on You”: The 
Inability of an Ex-Spouse to Waive Rights Under an ERISA Pension Plan [McGowan v. NJR Serv. 
2
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keep his or her pension.7  Congress protected the pension funds of 
employees by eliminating the ability to assign a vested pension, thereby 
excluding pensions from possible creditor claims.8  The unfortunate side 
effect of ERISA was the difficulty that divorce courts faced in dividing 
retirement pensions between ex-spouses in order to achieve an equitable 
property division.9  Congress cured this deficiency with the Retirement 
Equity Act of 1984 (REA).10  The REA carved out a specific exception 
to allow the assignment of pensions in matters of divorce.11  In order to 
 
Corp., 423 F.3d 241 (3d Cir. 2005)], 45 WASHBURN L.J. 687, 690 (2006) (stating that President 
Gerald Ford signed ERISA into law on Labor Day, 1974). 
 7. 29 U.S.C.S. § 1001(a) (Lexis 2007) (“[I]t is desirable in the interests of employees and 
their beneficiaries . . . that disclosure be made and safeguards be provided with respect to the 
establishment, operation, and administration of [employee benefit plans].”).  See also T. Leigh 
Anenson & Dr. Karen Eilers Lahey, The Crisis in Corporate America:  Private Pension Liability 
and Proposals For Reform, 9 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 495, 495 (2007) (“On September 2, 1974, 
Congress enacted the Employment Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) to preserve and 
protect the pension plans of millions of American workers.”); Jaffke, supra note 2, at 260 
(describing how the shut down of the Studebaker plant in 1963, which led to over 2,900 workers 
losing all their pension rights, led to Congress regulating the field of retirement pensions). 
 8. Leslie A. Kulick, What Are the Limitations On QDROS?, 61 J. MO. B. 89, 89 (2005) 
(stating that Congress required anti-alienation clauses in all ERISA-qualified plans so that the plans 
would be largely non-attachable by creditors).  See also Fox Valley & Vicinity Constr. Workers 
Pension Fund v. Brown, 897 F.2d 275, 278 (7th Cir. 1990) (“ERISA provides that a pension plan 
must prohibit the alienation or assignment of benefits.  These ‘spendthrift’ provisions are designed 
to prevent unwise alienation or assignment.”) (internal citations omitted); Margaret R. Cooper, A 
Family Practitioner’s Guide To Overcoming QDRO Phobia, 8 DEL. L. REV. 213, 214 (2006) 
(“[The] purpose of ERISA is to protect pension benefits and protect employees by barring pension 
benefits from being used to satisfy judgments.”). 
 9. Cooper, supra note 8, at 214, stating: 
Throughout the 1970s and early 1980s the anti-assignment clause conflicted with 
evolving state law that recognized pension rights as marital property subject to division 
as a part of a divorce. Congress resolved this dilemma in 1984 when it amended ERISA 
by passing the Retirement Equity Act (REA).  REA provided for certain exceptions to 
the anti-assignment clause of ERISA, allowing assignment of pension benefits pursuant 
to court orders that meet the statutory requirements of a qualified domestic relations 
order. 
Id.  See also Maddox & Cassidy, supra note 1, at 437-40 (describing the hurdles a court had to work 
through in order to divide a pension in a divorce proceeding under state law without running afoul 
of ERISA and the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution). 
 10. Retirement Equity Act of 1984 (REA), Pub. L. No. 98-397, 98 Stat. 1426.  See also 
Cooper, supra note 8, at 214; Maddox & Cassidy, supra note 1, at 440 (“The [REA] was enacted in 
part to clarify the scope of ERISA’s spendthrift and preemption provisions insofar as they pertain to 
state court orders dividing a participant’s interest in an ERISA-qualified plan.”). 
 11. 29 U.S.C.S. § 1056(d) (Lexis 2007), providing: 
(1) Each pension plan shall provide that benefits provided under the plan may not be 
assigned or alienated. 
. . .  
(3)(A) Paragraph (1) shall apply to the creation, assignment, or recognition of a right to 
any benefit payable with respect to a participant pursuant to a domestic relations order, 
3
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divide a pension, the parties and the court must file a Qualified Domestic 
Relations Order (QDRO).12  However, in order to become “qualified,” 
the pension plan administrator must approve the Domestic Relations 
Order (DRO).13 
The process of drafting a QDRO can be time-consuming and 
costly.14  The QDRO must conform to ERISA and the pension plan’s 
specifications and guidelines.15  A pension plan administrator may have 
a specific format or form for QDROs that parties submit for his 
approval.16  This boilerplate form may not be advantageous to the non-
 
except that paragraph (1) shall not apply if the order is determined to be a qualified 
domestic relations order.  Each pension plan shall provide for the payment of benefits in 
accordance with the applicable requirements of any qualified domestic relations order. 
Id. 
 12. Aaron Klein, Note, Divorce, Death, And Posthumous QDROs: When Is It Too Late For A 
Divorcee To Claim Pension Benefits Under ERISA?, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 1651, 1653-54 (2005) 
(stating that in order for a former spouse to receive benefits from a ex-spouse’s retirement plan, the 
non-employee spouse must first obtain a domestic relations order (DRO) and then transform the 
DRO into a QDRO). 
 13. Voit & Parris, supra note 3, at 26 (“[A] court order to divide retirement benefits is not a 
QDRO until it is qualified or approved by the plan or the plan administrator.  It is not qualified by 
the court.”).  See also Klein, supra note 12, at 1654 (stating that the any domestic relations order 
(DRO) must meet “stringent formalistic and substantive requirements before the pension plan may 
deem it ‘qualified.’”); Cooper, supra note 8, at 223 (explaining that a judge must sign the order for 
it to become a DRO). 
 14. Klein, supra note 12, at 1654, 1655 (stating that the process of drafting and gaining 
approval of a QDRO is long and complex and that sometimes a participant in a pension plan will 
actually die before a QDRO is issued).  Klein states: “nowhere does ERISA state that a former 
spouse must obtain a QDRO before the plan participant’s death.  ERISA does not contain an express 
provision mandating a former spouse obtain a QDRO as of a certain date.”  Id.  See also Gary 
Shulman, QDROs -- The Ticking Time Bomb, 23 FAM. ADV. 26, 26 (2001) (“Most family law 
attorneys are aware of the potential adverse consequences of a participant’s dying before the QDRO 
is drafted.”); Friesen v. Friesen, No. 07-AP-110, 2008 WL 603191, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. 2008) 
(stating that the parties in that particular case took six years to draft and file a QDRO).   
 15. Klein, supra note 12, at 1663-64 (stating the QDRO must satisfy “exacting procedural 
requirements” of ERISA).  Once a spouse receives benefits pursuant to a divorce decree, the ex-
spouse must have the DRO “qualified” by the pension plan administrator who has the right to reject 
the DRO as unqualified.  Id.  See generally Voit & Parris, supra note 3 (describing the differences 
between defined benefit and defined contribution plans and how a QDRO must be drafted so that it 
can be carried out under the plan specifications).  See also Cooper, supra note 8, at 215-16 
(describing the requirements of the QDRO set forth in ERISA as well as limitations which the 
QDRO may not specify). 
 16. Cooper, supra note 8, at 222, stating that: 
Most Plans provide a sample QDRO that may be set up as a fill-in-the-blank form.  
These forms can be dangerous if the blanks are simply filled in with little or no regard to 
the language of the stipulated order.  Samples are designed to simplify the approval 
process for the Plan Administrator and do not safeguard important rights and negotiated 
terms. 
Id. 
4
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employee spouse, thus requiring modification.17  The process of drafting, 
modifying, and obtaining final approval from a pension plan 
administrator can take considerable time,18 drawing out the divorce 
proceedings and further inconveniencing the parties involved.19  This 
time delay also has an impact on the rights of the ex-spouse concerning 
other areas of the divorce decree besides the right to a pension.20 
 
 17. Id.  See also QDROs: the Division of Pensions through Qualified Domestic Relations 
Order, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR AND WELFARE BENEFITS ADMIN. at Q 3-1 (1997), available at  
http://library.findlaw.com/1999/Mar/8/130758.pdf [hereinafter Division of Pensions] (stating that 
“[t]here is no single ‘best’ way to divide pension benefits in a QDRO” and that the specific facts of 
the case will determine the best way to divide a pension). 
 18. Klein, supra note 12, at 1655, 1666-67 (stating that participants in pension plans can die 
before a QDRO is drafted and that the process of “obtaining a QDRO can be extensive and time-
consuming.”).  See also Jaffke, supra note 2, at 298 (recognizing that there are costs and time delays 
in processing QDROs in divorce cases); Shulman, supra note 14, at 26 (indicating that participants 
in a pension plan at times have died before a QDRO is drafted); Division of Pensions, supra note 
17, at Q 2-10 (stating that there is no time limit in which a Plan Administrator must determine 
whether a DRO is a QDRO, but that the determination must be within a reasonable time, depending 
on the circumstances); 29 U.S.C.S. § 1056(d)(3)(G)(i)(II) (Lexis 2007).  
 19. Derrit v. Derrit, 836 N.E.2d 39, 43 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005) (stating that it would be 
impractical to withhold hearing an appeal due to the lack of a QDRO because the parties should not 
have to wait on actions of non-parties to draft a proper QDRO before litigating their disputed 
issues).  See also Division of Pensions, supra note 17, at Q 2-4, Q 2-10 (stating that there is no 
specified time limit on how long a Pension Plan Administrator can take to decide whether a DRO is 
a QDRO, but only that the time must be reasonable).  ERISA provides that a Pension Plan 
Administrator must preserve separate accounts for each party subject to the DRO for up to 18 
months after payments are due under the pension plan while the DRO is in dispute.  Id. at Q 2-11.  
See also 29 U.S.C.S. § 1056(d)(3)(H)(iii)(II) (Lexis 2007) (providing provisions for how the 
Pension Plan Administrator should handle pension plan proceeds when the QDRO is disputed for 
longer than eighteen months after the time in which pension plan payments are to start under the 
plan). 
 20. Cody v. Riecker, 594 F.2d 314, 315 (2d Cir. 1979) (stating that a state court can split up 
an employee’s pension in order to pay court-ordered support obligations and not run afoul of 
ERISA); Lyddy v. Lyddy, No. L-89-245, 1990 Ohio App. LEXIS 4519, at *6-7 (Ohio Ct. App. 
1990) (allowing a QDRO to use pension benefits to pay alimony obligations ordered by the court); 
Levine v. Levine, Case No. 96CA17, 1997 Ohio App. LEXIS 4312, at *13-14 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997) 
(following a previously superseded case, Holcomb v. Holcomb, 542 N.E.2d 597, 601 (Ohio 1989), 
for the proposition that a spouse’s pension is marital property that does not have to be divided up 
equally, but can be used after other property has been distributed in order to help sustain the other 
spouse for a specified amount of time).  Holcomb was superseded by OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 
3105.171 & 3105.18 (2007), which eliminated the concept of alimony in Ohio by dividing it into its 
component parts, as stated in Barber v. Barber, Case No. 1804, 1992 Ohio App. LEXIS 4056, at *8 
(Ohio Ct. App. 1992); Moser v. Moser, C.A. No. 94CA005959, 1995 Ohio App. LEXIS 2036, at *7 
(Ohio Ct. App. 1995) (providing, “[t]o qualify as a QDRO, an order must relate to the provision of 
child support, alimony payments or marital property rights . . . , and it must be made pursuant to 
state domestic relations law.” (quoting Albertson v. Ryder, 621 N.E.2d 480 (Ohio Ct. App.1993))). 
5
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A QDRO is part of the property settlement in a divorce decree.21  In 
order to appeal a divorce decree, it must be a final appealable order.22  A 
divorce decree is not a final appealable order unless all ancillary issues 
to the divorce are determined, including the property division.23  An 
issue arises when a pension plan administrator has not yet approved a 
QDRO and the parties wish to appeal a decision by the divorce court.24  
Important issues such as child custody, child support, alimony, or rights 
to personal property may be in dispute.25  These rights granted by the 
 
 21. Bohnlein v. Bohnlein, 463 N.E.2d 666, 667 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 1983) (ruling for the first 
time in Ohio on the issue of whether a pension is marital property).  “[I]n a divorce action, an 
employee-spouse’s contractual rights to a pension or profit-sharing plan constitute marital property 
which should be divided between the spouses.”  Id.  Baker v. Baker, Case No. 13-95-36, 1996 Ohio 
App. LEXIS 307, at *7-9 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996) (“Subject to the trial court’s discretion, pension 
benefits are to be considered in the marital property division, and divided equitably.”); Schrader v. 
Schrader, No. L-03-1171, 2005 WL 195487, at *6 (Ohio. Ct. App. 2005) (“It is well-settled that 
pension and retirement benefits earned during the course of the marriage are marital assets subject 
to division upon a divorce.”); Hoyt v. Hoyt, 559 N.E.2d 1292, 1294-95 (Ohio 1990) (“The general 
rule is that pension or retirement benefits earned during the course of a marriage are marital assets 
and a factor to be considered not only in the division of property, but also in relationship to an 
award of alimony.”). 
 22. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2505.02(B) (2008) (providing seven methods in which an order 
can become a final appealable order that can be “reviewed, affirmed, modified, or reversed, with or 
without retrial”).  See also Atkinson v. Atkinson, 856 N.E.2d 1023, 1025 (Ohio Ct. App. 2006) 
(stating that a final appealable order “is one that affects a substantial right and, in effect, determines 
the action, or . . . an order that affects a substantial right made in a special proceeding.”).  The court 
found that the trial court’s judgment was not a final appealable order because the order did not fully 
determine the divorce because there was not a child support order entered by the court.  Id. at 1026. 
 23. OHIO CIV. R. 75(F) (2007).  See also infra note 147 and accompanying text. 
 24. Musci v. Musci, No. 23088, 2006 WL 3208558, at *1-2 (Ohio Ct. App. 2006) (stating that 
parties had previously been before the court to litigate child support issues, but were denied an 
appeal because the court-ordered QDRO had not been entered.  The parties had to go back and have 
the trial court enter an order that a QDRO was not necessary and have that portion of the divorce 
decree vacated before the appellate court would hear the appeal.).  See also Batt v. Batt, Nos. 82740 
& 83452, 2004 WL 717373, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. 2004); (dismissing an appeal in which the trial 
court ordered two QDROs to be entered and only one had been filed).  In Batt, the wife wished to 
appeal the QDRO that the court filed because she claimed it did not reflect the parties’ agreement.  
Id.  The appellate court would not hear the case due to a lack of jurisdiction because the second 
QDRO had not yet been entered.  Id. at *1-2.   
 25. In re James, 866 N.E.2d 467, 468-69 (Ohio 2007) (appealing a child custody decision); 
Justice v. Justice, No. CA2006-11-134, 2007 WL 2821794, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. 2007) (appealing a 
child support order); Abbott v. Abbott, No. F-06-020, 2007 WL 2874282, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. 
2007) (appealing a divorce decree based on determinations of child support, child custody, property 
settlement, and spousal support); Handy v. Handy, No.2006AP110064, 2007 WL 2429735, at *1-2 
(Ohio Ct. App. 2007) (appealing a divorce decree due to the division of marital assets, a distributive 
award made to one spouse, and the trial court’s failure to reserve jurisdiction to modify spousal 
support); Kassicieh v. Mascotti, Nos. 05AP-684 & 06AP-1224, 2007 WL 2800374, at *1 (Ohio Ct. 
App. 2007) (appealing the trial court’s allocation of guardian’s fees between the ex-spouses, child 
support obligation, child support overpayment by one spouse, and the court’s finding that ex-
husband’s debt to the ex-wife was non-dischargeable in bankruptcy).  See also Laura Beresh Taylor, 
6
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trial court in a divorce decree may become irreversible as time passes 
and an ex-spouse uses or sells personal property, places a child in a new 
home or school, or makes alimony and child support payments.26  If 
parties must wait for approval of a QDRO, the right to appeal may be of 
little use.  In the past, a minority of Ohio courts chose to resolve this 
inequity by allowing parties to appeal a divorce decree before a pension 
plan administrator approved the QDRO, provided the divorce decree met 
certain requirements.27  A majority of Ohio courts, however, required 
approval of the QDRO before a divorce decree became final and 
appealable.28  This spilt in authority prompted the Ohio Supreme Court 
 
Note, C.R.B. v. C.C. and B.C.:  Protecting Children’s Need for Stability in Custody Modification 
Disputes Between Biological Parents and Third Parties, 32 AKRON L. REV. 371, 371 (1999) (“More 
than one million American children are affected by their parents’ divorce each year, and custody 
decisions are ‘among the most difficult decisions judges must make today.’”). 
 26. Robert E. Emery, David Sbarra & Tara Grover, Divorce Mediation: Research and 
Reflections, 43 FAM. CT. REV. 22, 30 (2005) (stating that “contact between divorced fathers and 
their children is infrequent” and decreases as time passes).  The authors believe this is a product of 
how adults manage the grief and pain of divorce, by turning away from the ex-spouses and, as a 
result, end up divorcing the marital children as well.  Id.; John H. Grych, Interparental Conflict as a 
Risk Factor for Child Maladjustment: Implications for the Development of Prevention Programs, 43 
FAM. CT. REV. 97, 99 (2005) (stating that as time passes, ex-spouses become less contentious and 
start to lead increasingly separate lives).  See also Sarah L. Gottfried, Note, Virtual Visitation:  The 
New Wave of Communication Between Children and Non-Custodial Parents In Relocation Cases, 9 
CARDOZO WOMEN’S L.J. 567, 567 (2003) (stating that mothers are the heads of households for 
ninety percent of children of divorce and seventy-five percent of them relocate at least one time 
within four years after the divorce); See generally Merle H. Weiner, Inertia and Inequality: 
Reconceptualizing Disputes Over Parental Relocation, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1747 (2007) 
(describing the problem of one spouse relocating and how the courts have dealt with the child 
custody issues involved in such moving). 
 27. Derrit v. Derrit, 836 N.E.2d 39, 43 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005) (allowing an appeal to go 
forward despite the fact that a QDRO had not been filed “so long as [the trial court] had directed in 
its judgment entry and finding of facts how the pension/retirement assets are to be divided”). 
 28. Forman v. Forman, No. 9-06-63, 2007 WL 2757630, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. 2007) 
(dismissing due to the lack of an appealable order because a Division of Property Order, the Ohio 
equivalent of a QDRO, had not been filed); Musci, 2006 WL 3208558 at *2 (previously denying an 
appeal because a QDRO was not filed); Cooper v. Cooper, No. 84652, 2005 WL 376608, at *1 
(Ohio Ct. App. 2005) (dismissing appeal for lack of a QDRO); Green v. Green, No.04AP-61, 2005 
WL 468234, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005) (dismissing an appeal because the trial court had not yet 
entered a QDRO or DOPO); Stare v. Stare, No. 03 CA 109, 2004 WL 2004152, at *2 (Ohio Ct. 
App. 2004) (stating that a “clear majority of Ohio appellate courts have consistently held that 
divorce orders are not final and appealable if a QDRO has been ordered but not prepared”).  The 
court declined to follow a case in which an appeal was granted despite the fact that a QDRO had not 
been filed.  Id. at *3; Batt, 2004 WL 717373, at *1 (stating that a judgment dividing pension rights 
between spouses is not appealable until a QDRO has been entered); Procuniar v. Procuniar, C.A. 
Case No. 95-CA-19, 1995 Ohio App. LEXIS 3929, at *5-6 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995) (rejecting an 
argument that an appeal was not timely because it was not filed until the QDRO was filed).  The 
Procuniar court stated that there was no substantial right affected until the QDRO was filed.  Id. at 
* 6. 
7
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to grant review of Wilson v. Wilson29 in December of 2006.  In 
November of 2007, the Court held that divorce decrees are appealable 
before the parties file a QDRO.30   
This Comment focuses on when a divorce decree should become a 
final appealable order if the decree requires the filing of a QDRO.  Part I 
describes the evolution of the law surrounding pensions.  It sets forth the 
relevant sections of ERISA and REA, and how the courts have applied 
these laws.  Part I contains a brief description of the kinds of pensions 
that a QDRO does and does not cover.  Part II analyzes the issue of 
appealable orders and the Ohio Appellate Courts’ split on the issue of 
when a divorce decree that requires a QDRO becomes appealable.  Part 
III reviews the Wilson v. Wilson decision and its effects.  Part IV is a 
critique of the Ohio Supreme Court decision in Wilson v. Wilson.  By 
allowing couples to appeal a divorce decree before a QDRO filing, the 
Ohio Supreme Court correctly resolved an important issue in Ohio 
family law with the Wilson decision.  There remains an issue, however, 
of proper procedure in dealing with an appeal from the QDRO itself, as 
well as the impact of Wilson on other areas of law.   
II.  BACKGROUND 
Pension plans became popular after World War II when labor 
unions began actively bargaining for retirement plans in collective 
bargaining agreements.31  The United Auto Workers union (UAW) and 
the United Steelworkers unions pioneered efforts to establish retirement 
plans to provide financial security for aging workers and more job 
opportunities for young laborers.32  But many of these plans met with 
 
 29. Wilson v. Wilson, No. 05CA0078, 2006 WL 2336871, at *1-2 (Ohio Ct. App. 2006) 
(dismissing an appeal on August 14, 2006, from the parties’ divorce decree due to the fact that a 
QDRO had not yet been filed with the court; therefore the divorce decree was not a final appealable 
order and the Appellate Court lacked jurisdiction), review granted, Wilson v. Wilson, 859 N.E.2d 
557 (Ohio 2006) (Table) (noting the Ohio Supreme Court granted review of the appellate decision 
on December 27, 2006). 
 30. Wilson v. Wilson, 878 N.E.2d 16, 18 (Ohio 2007). 
 31. James A. Wooten, “The Most Glorious Story of Failure in the Business”: The 
Studebaker-Packard Corporation and the Origins of ERISA, 49 BUFF. L. REV. 683, 686-87 (2001) 
(recounting the events in the automobile industry and steel industry during the late 1940s that 
increased need for pension plans and caused union officials to bargain for pension plans that 
covered more employees than just the top management). 
 32. Id. at 686-89.  Unions associated with the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) 
began bargaining for retirement plans in their collective bargaining agreements in the late 1940s.  
Id. at 686-87.  The UAW and the Steelworkers unions followed suit.  Id. at 687.  The desire for the 
pension plans came from the aging workforce that was encouraged to stay on the job during World 
War II and then could not retire on Social Security, which had diminished in value due to wartime 
8
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financial disaster as the costs of keeping the plans alive were too high 
for failing businesses.33  This caused Congress to start regulating pension 
plans34 and how employers funded them.35 
A.  Evolution of the Law 
Congress passed ERISA in 1974.36  Before Congress enacted 
ERISA, it was common for employers to pay out retirement benefits to 
an employee only if the employee kept his job until retirement age.37  
 
inflation.  Id.  Unions used pensions as a way of inducing older workers to retire and create job 
opportunities for younger workers in a more mechanized and productive industry.  Wooten, supra 
note 31, at 689.  See also Anenson & Lahey, supra note 7, at 498 (stating that pension plans allow 
employers to “systematically replenish” the workforce by encouraging older, less productive 
workers to retire and allow younger workers to be promoted). 
 33. Wooten, supra note 31, at 692-97, 730.  In the years immediately after World War II, 
small independent automobile manufacturers such as Nash, Packard, Studebaker, and the Kaiser-
Frazer Corporation did very well, and the UAW successfully negotiated for pension plans with these 
manufacturers in the early 1950s.  Id. at 691-93.  However, the automobile market declined sharply 
in 1953, forcing mergers among these companies that required a large number of workers to lose out 
on their pension benefits that had not vested.  Id. at 693-94.  These losses pushed UAW to obtain 
vested pension rights for employees with ten or more years of service after age 29.  Id. at 697.  The 
vested pension plan rights proved of little use as companies such as Packard-Studebaker went out of 
business, defaulting on their pension obligations.  Id. at 730.  For example, when Studebaker finally 
closed its plant in South Bend, its pension plan fund was more than $15 million short of meeting its 
obligations for the 4,392 employees entitled to receive benefits.  Wooten, supra note 31, at 697. 
 34. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, § 2(b), Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 
829.  Stating: 
It is hereby declared to be the policy of this Act to protect interstate commerce and the 
interests of participants in employee benefit plans and their beneficiaries, by requiring 
the disclosure and reporting to participants and beneficiaries of financial and other 
information with respect thereto, by establishing standards of conduct, responsibility, 
and obligation for fiduciaries of employee benefit plans, and by providing for 
appropriate remedies, sanctions, and ready access to the Federal courts.  
Id.  See also 29 U.S.C.S. § 1001(b) (Lexis 2007).  
 35. ERISA § 2(c).  Stating: 
It is hereby further declared to be the policy of this Act to protect interstate commerce, 
the Federal taxing power, and the interests of participants in private pension plans and 
their beneficiaries by improving the equitable character and the soundness of such plans 
by requiring them to vest the accrued benefits of employees with significant periods of 
service, to meet minimum standards of funding, and by requiring plan termination 
insurance. 
Id.  See also 29 U.S.C.S. § 1001(c) (Lexis 2007). 
 36. See generally ERISA.  See also Michael B. Snyder, Qualified Dom. Rel. Ord. § 1:4 
(2007) (describing how ERISA was enacted and the committees that played a role in negotiating the 
passing of the law).   
 37. Snyder, supra note 36, at § 1:4.  Stating: 
Prior to the enactment of [ERISA], it apparently was not uncommon for an employee to 
be promised a retirement benefit on the condition that he remain employed until he or 
she retired.   
There was often no letter or document; a handshake was the law of the retirement plan.  
9
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Nothing more than a handshake may have evidenced the agreement to 
provide pension benefits.38  ERISA changed the landscape of pension 
law, mandating certain reporting procedures,39 record keeping,40 funding 
requirements,41 and creating the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation 
(PBGC) to provide protection for pension plan participants against plan 
termination.42   
ERISA contains four titles.43  Title I deals with the reporting 
requirements to which a pension plan administrator must adhere.44  The 
pension plan administrator can be a designated person under the plan, a 
sponsor, employer, or anyone the Secretary of Labor prescribes as the 
administrator if the secretary cannot find a named administrator or 
sponsor.45  The administrator must provide an annual report that includes 
a financial statement and opinion,46 number of employees in the plan,47 
names and addresses of any fiduciary,48 and an actuarial statement.49  
 
There was sufficient anecdotal evidence by the early 1970s of abuses in the private 
retirement system to cause a ground swell of congressional interest.  Too many 
employees, it was said, were being denied the benefits they had been promised.  
Congressional action began to move toward the creation of ERISA. 
Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. ERISA §§ 101-111.  ERISA requires certain disclosures and reporting, including a plan 
description (§ 102) and annual reports (§ 103).  See also 29 U.S.C.S. §§ 1021-1031 (Lexis 2008).  
 40. ERISA §§ 107, 209.  ERISA requires the plan administrator to keep records for each 
employee that shows for what benefits the employee is eligible and what benefits the employee may 
become eligible.  See also 29 U.S.C.S. §§ 1027, 1059 (Lexis 2008). 
 41. ERISA § 302.  ERISA requires minimum funding standards for covered plans each year.  
Id.  See also 29 U.S.C.S. § 1082 (Lexis 2008).  
 42. ERISA §§ 4002-4003.  ERISA established the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation 
(PBGC) as a non-profit corporation that has the power to enforce ERISA, investigate pension plans, 
and sue for violations of ERISA.  Id.  See also 29 U.S.C.S. §§ 1302-1303 (Lexis 2008). 
 43. ERISA § 1.  ERISA’s table of contents divides the act into four titles:  Title I – Protection 
of Employee Benefit Plans, Title II – Amendments to the Internal Revenue Code Relating to 
Retirement Plans, Title III – Jurisdiction, Administration, Enforcement; Joint Pension Task Force, 
etc., and Title IV – Plan Termination Insurance.   
 44. ERISA § 1. See also Snyder, supra note 36, at § 1:4.  Snyder describes Title I of ERISA 
as including provisions “relating to fiduciary standards, reporting and disclosure, and employee 
protection and enforcement.”  Id.  
 45. ERISA § 3(16).  See also 29 U.S.C.S. § 1002(16) (Lexis 2008). 
 46. ERISA §§ 103(a)(1)(B)(i), 103(a)(3)(A).  Section 103 of ERISA requires that an opinion 
by an “independent qualified public accountant” that the financial statements conform to generally 
accepted auditing standards and that all information fairly represents information in the context of 
the whole financial statement.  See also 29 U.S.C.S. § 1023(a)(1)(B)(i) (Lexis 2008). 
 47. ERISA § 103(c)(1).  See also 29 U.S.C.S. § 1023(c)(1) (Lexis 2008). 
 48. ERISA § 103(c)(2).  See also ERISA § 3(21) (defining a fiduciary as someone who 
exercises discretionary authority or discretionary control over the management of the plan or its 
assets, gives investment advice to the plan for a fee, or has discretionary responsibility or authority 
over the administration of the plan).  See also 29 U.S.C.S. §§ 1002(21), 1023(c)(2) (Lexis 2008). 
10
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The administrator must also provide a plan description to all participants 
and beneficiaries of the plan,50 updated plan descriptions every five 
years to those receiving benefits,51 and a written statement of what 
benefits have accrued, or will become non-forfeitable, for each 
participant of the plan upon request.52  The Secretary of Labor 
established the office of Pension and Welfare Benefits Administration 
(PWBA) to enforce the disclosure and reporting requirements of 
ERISA.53  These reporting requirements are very complicated.54  Title I 
also requires minimum funding for pension plans55 and provides for 
certain fiduciary responsibilities of pension plan administrators.56 
Title II of ERISA deals with the changes made to the Internal 
Revenue Code.57  The authority to issue regulations for the funding and 
 
 49. ERISA §§ 103(a)(1)(B)(ii), 103(a)(4).  An “enrolled actuary” must form an opinion as to 
whether the financial statements are “in the aggregate reasonably related to the experience of the 
plan and to reasonable expectations; and represent his best estimate of anticipated experience under 
the plan.”  ERISA §103(a)(4)(B)(i) & (ii).  See also ERISA § 103(d) (describing eleven specific 
items that must be included in the actuarial statement); ERISA §§ 3041-3043 (establishing the Joint 
Board for the Enrollment of Actuaries for the purpose of establishing standards for enrolling 
actuaries, and enforcing those standards).  An “enrolled actuary” means a “person who is enrolled 
by the Joint Board for the Enrollment of Actuaries . . . .” Id. at § 3043; 29 U.S.C.S. §§ 
1023(a)(1)(B)(ii), (a)(4)(A), (d), 1241-1242 (Lexis 2008); 26 U.S.C.S. § 7701(a)(35) (Lexis 2008). 
 50. ERISA §§ 104(a)(1)(C), 104(b).  See also 29 U.S.C.S. § 1024(b) (Lexis 2008).  
 51. ERISA § 104(b)(1)(B) (“The administrator shall furnish to each participant, and each 
beneficiary receiving benefits under the plan, every fifth year after the plan becomes subject to this 
part an updated summary plan description described in section 102 which integrates all plan 
amendments made within such five-year period . . .”).  See also 29 U.S.C.S. § 1024(b)(1) (Lexis 
2008). 
 52. ERISA § 105(a). 
Each administrator of an employee pension benefit plan shall furnish to any plan 
participant or beneficiary who so requests in writing, a statement indicating, on the basis 
of the latest available information – 
(1) the total benefits accrued, and 
(2) the nonforfeitable pension benefits, if any, which have accrued, or the earliest date on 
which benefits will become nonforfeitable. 
Id.  See also 29 U.S.C.S. § 1025(a) (Lexis 2008). 
 53. Snyder, supra note 36, at § 1:4.  See also 29 C.F.R. §§ 2520 & 2560 (2008) (detailing the 
various reporting requirements that the Secretary of Labor has mandated under Title I of ERISA); 5 
C.F.R. § 2641, App. B (2007) (stating that the Employee Benefits Security Administration, formerly 
the Pension and Welfare Benefits Administration, became effective on May 16, 1997 under the 
Department of Labor). 
 54. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 2520 & 2560 (2008) (detailing the numerous reporting requirements that 
have been developed under ERISA). 
 55. ERISA §§ 301-306.  See also 29 U.S.C.S. §§ 1081-1085(b) (Lexis 2008).  
 56. ERISA §§ 401-414.  The fiduciary responsibilities include providing adequate benefits to 
plan participants, minimizing expenses, and diversifying investments.  Id. at § 404(a)(1).  See also 
29 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1114 (2000). 
 57. ERISA §§ 1001-2008.  Title II of ERISA is labeled “Amendments To The Internal 
Revenue Code Relating To Retirement Plans.”  Id.  Section 1001 states:  “Except as otherwise 
11
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vesting of ERISA plans was originally given to the Department of 
Labor, but in 1978, the authority was transferred to the Internal Revenue 
Service.58  But the Department of Labor still enforces Title III of 
ERISA,59 dealing with jurisdiction and administration.60  Title III also 
establishes the Joint Pension Task Force,61 which had the duty of 
studying the effect of ERISA on pension plans and reporting to 
Congress.62  Title IV deals with plan termination,63 establishes the 
PBGC,64 and sets out the types of benefits guaranteed by the PBGC.65  
Title IV also contains the procedure for terminating a pension plan66 and 
the liability of employers upon plan termination.67 
Congress amended ERISA several times during the 1980s.68  One 
of the amendments in 198469 was the Retirement Equity Act (REA).70  
 
provided, whenever in this title an amendment or repeal is expressed in terms of an amendment to, 
or repeal of, a section or other provision, the reference shall be considered to be made to a section or 
other provision of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.”  Id. at § 1001.  See also 26 U.S.C. §§ 410-
415 (2000).  
 58. Snyder, supra note 36, at § 1:4 (“The ERISA Reorganization Plan realigned and clarified 
the joint responsibility of qualified and nonqualified plans between the DOL and the Service.  By 
executive order of President Jimmy Carter, this plan transferred all authority to issue regulations, 
rulings, opinions, variances, and waivers pertaining to participation, vesting, and funding from the 
Secretary of Labor to the Secretary of the Treasury.”).  See also 44 Fed.Reg. 1065 (Jan. 3, 1979) 
(mandating that Reorganization Plan No. 4 become effective on December 31, 1978 by executive 
order of President Jimmy Carter); Reorganization Plan No. 4 of 1978, 43 Fed.Reg. 47,713 (Oct. 17, 
1978). 
 59. Snyder, supra note 36, at § 1:4 (stating that the DOL still governs issues of jurisdiction, 
enforcement, and administration under Title III). 
 60. ERISA §§3001-3043.  Title III of ERISA is labeled “Jurisdiction, Administration, 
Enforcement; Joint Pension Task Force, etc.”  Id.  See also 29 U.S.C.S. §§ 1201-1242 (Lexis 2008).  
 61. ERISA § 3021.  The Joint Pension Task Force was made up of “[t]he staffs of the 
Committee on Ways and Means and the Committee on Education and Labor of the House of 
Representatives, the Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation, and the Committee on Finance 
and the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare of the Senate . . . .”  Id.  See also 29 U.S.C.S. § 
1221 (Lexis 2008). 
 62. ERISA § 3022.  See also 29 U.S.C.S. § 1222 (Lexis 2008).  
 63. ERISA §§ 4001-4068.  Title IV of ERISA is labeled “Plan Termination Insurance” and 
includes such subdivisions as Coverage, Termination, and Liability.  Id.  See also 29 U.S.C. §§ 
1301-1453 (2000). 
 64. See supra note 42.  
 65. ERISA § 4022.  The PBGC guarantees all nonforfeitable benefits under a plan’s terms.  
Id.  See also 29 U.S.C.S. § 1321 (Lexis 2008). 
 66. ERISA § 4041-4048.  A plan may be terminated by a plan administrator under Section 
4041 or by a corporation under Section 4042.  See also 29 U.S.C.S. §§ 1341-1348 (Lexis 2008). 
 67. ERISA § 4061-4068.  The PBGC has the right to collect payment from employers who are 
liable upon termination of a pension plan under Sections 4062 (single employers), 4063 (a 
substantial employer of a plan), and 4064 (multiple employers).  Id. at § 4067.  See also 29 U.S.C.S. 
§§ 1361-1368 (Lexis 2008). 
 68. Snyder, supra note 36, at § 1:5 (listing the amendments to ERISA passed in the 1980s, 
such as the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 
12
Akron Law Review, Vol. 42 [2009], Iss. 2, Art. 8
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol42/iss2/8
13-DEAN_PUB_EDITS.DOC 4/14/2009  1:31 PM 
2009] WILSON V. WILSON 651 
Congress enacted REA in order to remedy ERISA’s anti-alienation 
provisions.71  In an attempt to protect a worker’s right to receive his or 
her pension, ERISA contained an anti-alienation provision that 
prevented courts from dividing pensions upon divorce.72  REA allowed a 
divorce court to divide ERISA pension plans upon divorce pursuant to a 
QDRO.73  The QDRO is a Domestic Relations Order (DRO)74 that meets 
certain specific requirements set out in REA.75  As long as a divorce 
 
1982, the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, the Retirement Equity Act of 1984, the Tax Reform Act of 
1986, the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986, the Pension Protection Act, and the 
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993).   
 69. Id. (showing two amendments to ERISA in 1984, the REA and the Deficit Reduction Act 
of 1984). 
 70. Retirement Equity Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-397, 98 Stat. 1426.   
 71. Charles T. Caliendo, Jr., Note, Removing the “Natural Distaste” from the Mouth of the 
Supreme Court with a Criminal Fraud Amendment to ERISA’s Anti-Alienation Rule, 68 ST. JOHN’S 
L. REV. 667, 677 (1994) (stating that the REA amended ERISA so that the anti-alienation provision 
would not apply in certain situations by way of QDROs).  
 72. ERISA § 206(d)(1)-(2).  It provides: 
(d) (1) Each pension plan shall provide that benefits provided under the plan may not be 
assigned or alienated. 
(2) For the purposes of paragraph (1) of this subsection, there shall not be taken into 
account any voluntary and revocable assignments of not to exceed 10 percent of any 
benefit payment, or of any irrevocable assignment or alienation of benefits executed 
before the date of enactment of this Act . . . .  
Id.  See also Caliendo, supra note 71, at 678 (“Prior to the enactment of REA, the courts 
were split on whether there was an implied exception to the anti-alienation rule for 
family support judgments.  Several courts had difficulty creating such an exception 
because of the anti-alienation mandate, but also because ERISA preempts ‘any and all 
State laws insofar as they may now or hereinafter relate to’ an ERISA pension plan.  
Consequently, in addition to the QDRO provision, REA effected a conforming 
amendment to ERISA exempting QDROs from ERISA’s state law preemption 
provision.”).   
 73. REA § 104(a)(3)(A).  Amending ERISA § 206(d) by adding: 
(3)(A) Paragraph (1) shall apply to the creation, assignment, or recognition of a right to 
any benefit payable with respect to a participant pursuant to a domestic relations order, 
except that paragraph (1) shall not apply if the order is determined to be a qualified 
domestic relations order.  Each pension plan shall provide for the payment of benefits in 
accordance with the applicable requirements of any qualified domestic relations order. 
Id.  
 74. REA § 104(a)(3)(B)(1984).  REA defines a domestic relations order as: 
(ii) the term ‘domestic relations order’ means any judgment, decree, or order (including 
approval of a property settlement agreement) which – 
(I) relates to the provision of child support, alimony payments, or marital property rights 
to a spouse, former spouse, child, or other dependent of a participant, and  
(II) is made pursuant to a State domestic relations law (including a community 
property law). 
Id.   
 75. REA § 104(a)(3)(B), (C), (D).  REA defines a qualified domestic relations order as: 
(B) For purposes of this paragraph –  
(i) the term ‘qualified domestic relations order’ means a domestic relations order – 
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court issued a DRO that was qualified under REA, an ERISA pension 
plan could be divided, and thus the QDRO was born.76 
B.  Types of Pension Plans Covered by ERISA 
ERISA does not apply to all pension plans.  ERISA expressly does 
not apply to government pension plans,77 church plans,78 plans 
maintained for workers’ compensation or unemployment,79 pension 
 
(I) which creates or recognizes the existence of an alternative payee’s right to, or assigns 
to an alternative payee the right to, receive all or a portion of the benefits payable with 
respect to a participant under a plan, and 
(II) with respect to which the requirements of subparagraphs (C) and (D) are met, . . . 
* * *  
(C) A domestic relations order meets the requirements of this subparagraph only if such 
order clearly specifies – 
(i) the name and last known mailing address (if any) of the participant and the name and 
mailing address of each alternative payee covered by the order. 
(ii) the amount or percentage of the participant’s benefits to be paid by the plan to each 
such alternative payee, or the manner in which such amount or percentage is to be 
determined, 
(iii) the number of payments or period to which such order applies, and 
(iv) each plan to which such order applies. 
(D) A domestic relations order meets the requirements of this subparagraph only if such 
order – 
(i) does not require a plan to provide any type of form of benefit, or any option, not 
otherwise provided under the plan, 
(ii) does not require the plan to provide increased benefits (determined on the basis of 
actuarial value), and  
(iii) does not require the payment of benefits to an alternative payee which are required 
to be paid to another alternate payee under another order previously determined to be a 
qualified domestic relations order. 
Id.   
 76. Wright, supra note 6, at 693 (stating that the REA was known as the “QDRO 
amendment,” and that a QDRO has to meet the requirements of § 1056(d)(3)(C) in order to assign 
part of the participant’s pension plan benefits to another individual). 
 77. 29 U.S.C.S. § 1003(b)(1) (Lexis 2008).  See also GARY A. SHULMAN & DAVID I. KELLEY, 
DIVIDING PENSIONS IN DIVORCE § 21.1 (2d ed. 1999).  The authors write: 
Government pensions such as from the Civil Service Retirement System (CSRS), the 
Federal Employees Retirement System (FERS), the Military Retirement System, and the 
Railroad Retirement Board allow for the equitable division of pension benefits through 
independent statutory vehicles that are outside the realm of qualified domestic relations 
orders (QDROs).  Governmental plans are not ERISA-governed plans and are therefore 
exempt from the standard QDRO provisions of the law. 
Id.    
 78. 29 U.S.C.S. § 1003(b)(2) (Lexis 2008).  See also VICTOR B. MEYEN & MARK W. 
DUNDEE, QUALIFIED DOMESTIC RELATIONS ORDER ANSWER BOOK 13-28 (2d ed. 1998) (stating 
that church plans are subject to applicable state and local laws and may be subject to ERISA if the 
plan elects to be covered, which may be an attractive option for a church plan that has no specific 
rule for dividing pensions on divorce).    
 79. 29 U.S.C.S. § 1003(b)(3) (Lexis 2008). 
14
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plans maintained outside the United States for the benefit of nonresident 
aliens,80 and “excess benefit plans.”81  Even with these exclusions, 
however, ERISA governs most pension plans in the United States.82  The 
most prominent plans covered by ERISA are the defined benefit and 
defined contribution pension plans.83 
The defined benefit pension plan was at one point in time the most 
popular type of pension plan in America.84  The defined benefit plan is a 
pension in which the employer promises to pay the employee a set 
amount of money upon retirement.85  The employer could pay the 
amount in one lump sum, in monthly payments, or a mixture of both.86  
The monthly payments may continue until the death of the employee or 
 
 80. 29 U.S.C.S. § 1003(b)(4) (Lexis 2008). 
 81. 29 U.S.C.S. § 1003(b)(5) (Lexis 2008).  See also 29 U.S.C.S. § 1002(36) (Lexis 2008) 
(defining an “excess benefit plan” as a plan that provides certain employees benefits that exceed 
limits set out in 26 U.S.C.S. § 415); GARY A. SHULMAN & DAVID I. KELLEY, DIVIDING PENSIONS 
IN DIVORCE 395 (2d ed. Supp. 2007) (“[T]raditional QDROs do not apply to nonqualified retirement 
plans, such as those afforded to CEOs and other company executives”). 
 82. T.P. Gallanis, Public Policy for Retirement Security in the 21st Century: Reform of 
Qualified Retirement Plans: ERISA and the Law of Succession, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 185, 186 (2004) 
(“ERISA federalized pension law, establishing federal rules governing the creation, administration, 
and termination of most pension plans.”).  
 83. Jeffrey M. Gorris, Comment, Waivers of ERISA Plan Benefits: Preventing Judicial 
Interpretations of a Complex Statute from Frustrating the Statute’s Simple Purpose, 155 U. PA. L. 
REV. 717, 719-20 (2007) (“There are two types of ERISA employee benefit plans: ‘employee 
welfare benefit plans’ . . . and ‘employee pension benefit plan[s]’ . . . . Pension plans can be 
categorized further as either ‘defined contribution plans’ (also called ‘individual account plans’) or 
‘defined benefit plans.’”).  See also Susan J. Stable, Pension Plan Investments in Employer 
Securities: More Is Not Always Better, 15 YALE J. ON REG. 61, 66 (1998) (“ERISA recognizes two 
broad categories of pension plans: defined benefit plans and defined contribution plans.”). 29 
U.S.C.S. § 1002(34), (35) (Lexis 2008) (defining the “defined contribution plan” and “defined 
benefit plan”). 
 84. Matthew Venhorst, Note & Commentary, Helping Individual Investors Do What They 
Know Is Right: The Save More for Retirement Act of 2005, 13 CONN. INS. L.J. 113, 115 (2006/2007) 
(stating that the defined benefit pension plan became popular after World War II and peaked in 
popularity in the 1970s with as many as sixty-two percent of all workers being covered only by a 
defined benefit plan; however, that number dropped to only thirteen percent by 1997). 
 85. Anenson & Lahey, supra note 7, at 500 (stating that the employer pays a “determinable 
benefit” that is usually tied to the employee’s earnings for the employee’s career or “final average”); 
Angela Boothe Noel, The Future of Cash Balance Plans: Inherently Illegal or a Viable Pension 
Option?, 56 ALA. L. REV. 899, 899-900 (2005) (describing how the formula for determining the 
benefits for a defined benefit pension plan can become “backloaded” due to the high salaries earned 
by long-time employees in the last three to five years of employment, making the defined benefit 
pension plan extremely expensive for employers).  
 86. Anenson & Lahey, supra note 7, at 500, 502 (describing the benefits paid out under a 
defined benefit plan as an annuity for the life of the employee and a cash balance plan as a hybrid 
defined benefit plan in which the benefit is typically distributed in one lump sum); Noel, supra note 
85, at 901-02 (stating that a cash balance plan is a defined benefit plan in which the employee can 
choose to receive a lump sum payment or a stream of payments).   
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the death of both the employee and his or her spouse.87  The employer 
bears the risk that the employee or the employee’s spouse will live long 
enough to consume all the benefits paid into the pension plan.88  ERISA 
covers defined benefit pension plans,89 insures them,90 and sets 
minimum funding standards for such plans.91 
A defined contribution pension plan is a plan in which the 
employee and employer make set contributions over the employment 
period of the employee.92  Upon retirement, the employee receives the 
whole pension plan account and then may cash out the whole account, 
receive income from the account, or receive a mixture of both.93  The 
defined contribution plan is becoming increasingly popular as employers 
try to shift the risk of funding retirement to the employee.94  The 
 
 87. Maria O’Brien Hylton, Constance Hiatt, Shannon Minter, & Teresa S. Collett, Same Sex 
Marriage and its Implications for Employee Benefits: Proceedings of the 2005 Meeting of the 
Association of American Law Schools Sections on Employee Benefits, and Sexual Orientation and 
Gender Identity Issues, 9 EMPL. RTS. & EMPLOY. POL’Y J. 499, 503 (2005) (describing how a 
defined benefit pension plan must provide survivorship benefits to a spouse of an employee under 
ERISA if the employee dies and if the employee dies before he or she retires, the spouse gets the 
pension).  See also 29 U.S.C.S. § 1055(a), (b)(1)(A) (2008) (mandating that any defined benefit plan 
provide a survivor annuity in the form of a “qualified joint and survivor annuity” or a “qualified 
preretirement survivor annuity”). 
 88. Kathleen H. Czarney, Note, The Future of Americans’ Pensions: Revamping Pension Plan 
Asset Allocation to Combat the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation’s Deficit, 51 CLEV. ST. L. 
REV. 153, 166 (2004) (stating that if there are not enough funds invested to pay for the employee’s 
retirement benefits under a defined benefit pension plan, the employer has a duty to “make up the 
difference”, therefore bearing the risk of investment).   
 89. Supra note 83.   
 90. Anenson & Lahey, supra note 7, at 504 (“Pursuant to ERISA, defined benefit pension 
plans are insured by the PBGC.”).  
 91. 29 U.S.C.S. § 1082 (Lexis 2008). 
 92. Anenson & Lahey, supra note 7, at 501 (describing the defined contribution plan as a plan 
in which the employer merely makes a fixed contribution and the employee gets whatever benefit 
has accumulated upon retirement, an example being the 401(k) plan); Czarney, supra note 88, at 
168 (describing the defined contribution plan as an immediately vesting pension plan that can take 
the form of an IRA, 401(k), or a Simplified Employer Pension (SEP)). 
 93. Edward A. Zelinsky, The Defined Contribution Paradigm, 114 YALE L.J. 451, 463-64 
(2004) (describing how a defined contribution pension plan is normally paid to the employee in one 
lump sum upon retirement and then it is up to the employee to invest the funds or purchase an 
annuity contract).  
 94. Paul J. Donahue, Plan Sponsor Fiduciary Duty for the Selection of Options in Participant-
Directed Defined Contribution Plans and the Choice Between Stable Value and Money Market, 39 
AKRON L. REV. 9, 9, 11 (2006) (“During 2002, employees and their employers contributed over $84 
billion to defined contribution pension plans (DC Plans), bringing the amount held in such plans on 
behalf of many of America’s working people to nearly $2 trillion: a staggering amount that 
exceeded by over $200 million the amount held in defined benefit pension plans (DB Plans).”).  Dr. 
Donahue goes on to write: 
[I]n recent years the economic importance of [defined contribution plans] has grown 
significantly.  At present, nearly 54 percent of total private pension plan assets are held 
16
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employee bears the risk of outliving the available funds in a defined 
contribution plan.95  ERISA covers the defined contribution pension 
plans of private employers.96 
C.  Treatment of the Law 
The ability to transfer rights from a pension fund under ERISA is 
very limited.  The United States Supreme Court has ruled several times 
that the ability to assign pension plan funds with a QDRO is a limited 
exception, not to be expanded to cover any other situations, no matter 
how equitable they may be.97  In 1990, the Supreme Court explained its 
rationale in one such case, Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers Nat’l Pension 
Fund.98   
In Sheet Metal, Curtis Guidry embezzled funds from the union for 
which he worked.99  While incarcerated, Mr. Guidry attempted to collect 
his pension from several pension plans he had through the union from 
which he had embezzled funds.100  The pension plans refused to allow 
Mr. Guidry to collect his pension, claiming Mr. Guidry forfeited his 
right to the pension when he stole from the Union.101  The Union 
intervened and claimed the funds should be paid to the Union until the 
Union had collected the $275,000 judgment against Mr. Guidry.102  The 
trial court ruled that Mr. Guidry did not forfeit the pension plan funds, 
but they were to be paid into a constructive trust for the Union until the 
Union’s judgment was satisfied.103  The trial court created an equitable 
 
in [defined contribution plans] – and this percentage is likely to increase, because while 
$80 billion was contributed to [defined contribution plans] in 2002, only $39 billion was 
contributed to [defined benefit plans]. 
Id. at 11 (footnotes omitted).  See also Czarney, supra note 88, at 169.  Ms. Czarney writes, 
“between 1984 and 1993 alone, defined contribution plans have grown by almost 900 percent.  The 
contributing factors for this shift in pension plans include the increased government regulation of 
defined benefit pensions, increased administrative costs, employment growth in small businesses, 
and the greater mobility that defined contribution plans offer.”  Id. (footnotes omitted). 
 95. Noel, supra note 85, at 901 (stating that in a defined contribution plan the employee 
decides how the money is invested, is entitled only to the account balance at the time of retirement, 
and therefore the employee bears the investment risk); Anenson & Lahey, supra note 7, at 501 
(stating that the potential disadvantage to the defined contribution plan is that the employees could 
“outlive their retirement resources”). 
 96. Supra note 83. 
 97. See infra notes 98-115 and accompanying text. 
 98. Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers Nat’l Pension Fund et al., 493 U.S. 365 (1990). 
 99. Id. at 367. 
 100. Id. at 368. 
 101. Id. at 368-69. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers Nat’l Pension Fund et al., 493 U.S. 365, 369-70 (1990). 
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exception to ERISA’s anti-alienation provisions for situations in which 
“the viability of a union and the members’ pension plans was damaged 
by the knavery of a union official.”104  The Supreme Court struck down 
the constructive trust, stating: 
Nor do we think it appropriate to approve any generalized equitable 
exception—either for employee malfeasance or for criminal 
misconduct—to ERISA’s prohibition on the assignment or alienation 
of pension benefits.  Section 206(d) [29 U.S.C.S. § 1056(d)] reflects a 
considered congressional policy choice, a decision to safeguard a 
stream of income for pensioners (and their dependents, who may be, 
and perhaps usually are, blameless), even if that decision prevents 
others from securing relief for the wrongs done them.  If exceptions to 
this policy are to be made, it is for Congress to undertake that task.105 
The Supreme Court interpreted ERISA’s anti-alienation provision 
broadly and REA’s QDRO exception narrowly, allowing pensioners to 
keep their pension benefits, despite inequitable results.106   
In 1997, the Supreme Court further strengthened ERISA in the case 
of Boggs v. Boggs.107  Boggs involved a marriage of over thirty years 
that ended upon the death of Mrs. Boggs.108  Mr. Boggs remarried, and 
then died nine years later.109  The children of the first marriage had a 
right to Mr. Boggs’ pension under state law because the first Mrs. Boggs 
devised her right in the pension to the children in her will, under 
Louisiana’s community property provisions.110  But the second Mrs. 
Boggs claimed she had the sole right to the pension under ERISA.111  
The Supreme Court ruled that ERISA pre-empted any state law that was 
in conflict with ERISA, such as community property laws.112  The Court 
 
 104. Id. at 370. 
 105. Id. at 376. 
 106. Sharon Reece, The Gilded Gates of Pension Protection: Amending the Anti-Alienation 
Provision of ERISA Section 206(d), 80 OR. L. REV. 379, 407-09 (2001) (recounting other court 
cases in which a guilty party was not forced to pay his or her victims restitution from a pension 
plan, such as the O.J. Simpson case).  
 107. Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U.S. 833 (1997). 
 108. Id. at 836. 
 109. Id.  
 110. Id. at 837. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U.S. 833, 854 (1997).  See also Tony Vecino, Note, Boggs v. Boggs: 
State Community Property and Succession Rights Wallow in ERISA’s Mire, 28 GOLDEN GATE U. L. 
REV. 571 (1998) (setting out a detailed explanation of the Boggs case and its ramifications).  Vecino 
writes 
[T]he case of Boggs v. Boggs . . . held that [ERISA] preempted Louisiana community 
property and succession laws and prohibited the inheritance of a nonemployee spouse’s 
community interest in pension plan benefits.  Although the Boggs holding involved 
18
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also explained that the QDRO exception to ERISA’s anti-alienation 
provision is a narrow exception that courts cannot use to give effect to a 
predeceasing non-participant spouse’s testamentary transfer.113  Boggs, 
in effect, made ERISA the only means of dividing a pension,114 and the 
QDRO one of only two processes by which a pension could be 
assigned.115 
Ohio courts have not been as restrictive as the United States 
Supreme Court.  Ohio state courts have attempted to find ways to 
expand the power of the QDRO or get around ERISA’s narrow 
exceptions to dividing pensions.116  In 1990, the Ohio Supreme Court 
 
preemption of a claim based on community property and succession rights, the Court’s 
holding is sufficiently broad to preempt any state laws that conflict with ERISA . . .  
Id. at 571 (footnotes omitted); Jayne Elizabeth Zanglein, “Meyered” in the Bogg of ERISA 
Preemption: Employee Benefits in the Fifth Circuit, 29 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 581, 588 (1998) (“The 
[Boggs] Court appears to have abandoned the use of this ‘relates to’ test and has substituted a 
conflict preemption test.”);  Karen A. Jordan, The Shifting Preemption Paradigm: Conceptual and 
Interpretive Issues, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1149, 1165-76 (1998) (discussing the different types of 
preemption used by the Supreme Court and the use of a kind of “Implied Preemption” in the Boggs 
case). 
 
 113. Id. at 848.  Justice Kennedy wrote: 
It should cause little surprise that Congress chose to protect the community property 
interests of separated and divorced spouses and their children, a traditional subject of 
domestic relations law, but not to accommodate testamentary transfers of pension plan 
benefits.  As a general matter, “the whole subject of the domestic relations of husband 
and wife, parent and child, belongs to the laws of the States and not to the laws of the 
United States. Support obligations, in particular, are “deeply rooted moral 
responsibilities” that Congress is unlikely to have intended to intrude upon. In accord 
with these principles, Congress ensured that state domestic relations orders, as long as 
they meet certain statutory requirements, are not pre-empted. 
Id.  (citations omitted).  Justice Kennedy went on to write, “ERISA’s pension plan anti-alienation 
provision is mandatory and contains only two exceptions, see §§ 1056(d)(2), (d)(3)(A), which are 
not subject to judicial expansion.”  Id. at 851.  But see Edward A. Zelinsky, Egelhoff, ERISA 
Preemption, and the Conundrum of the ‘Relate to’ Clause, 91 TAX NOTES 1917, 1919-21 (2001) 
(describing the Supreme Court’s differing views on ERISA preemption in the last 20 years).  
 114. William J. Kluwin, Using QDROs to Fund a Divorce: Recent Decisions Illustrate the 
Opportunities and the Pitfalls of QDROs, 34 AZ ATTORNEY 26, 37-38 (1997) (arguing that since 
Mr. Boggs had cashed out his pension plan and rolled it into an IRA that was not covered by 
ERISA, the Supreme Court seemed to allow the ERISA preemption to follow the pension funds 
even though the funds were not in a covered pension).  See also Erica S. Phillips, Casenote & 
Comment,  Equality in Life, Inequality in Death:  The Ramifications of the United States Supreme 
Court Decision in Boggs v. Boggs, 34 IDAHO L. REV. 623 (1998) (giving a detailed explanation of 
the Boggs case and criticizing the holding).   
 115. Phillips, supra note 114, at 641-47 (stating that the Boggs Court limited the ability to 
assign a pension to only the provisions expressly provided for by ERISA and REA, which include 
the QDRO and the qualified joint and survivor annuity, both of which were created by REA).  
 116. See infra notes 117-140 and accompanying text. 
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heard the case of Hoyt v. Hoyt.117  The parties in Hoyt were married for 
eighteen and one-half years and had four children when they divorced in 
1988.118  The trial court awarded the wife one-half of the husband’s 
General Motors (GM) pension and a survivorship benefit.119  The 
pension was vested but unmatured at the time of the divorce.120  The 
husband appealed the decision, claiming the court could not grant the 
wife a survivorship benefit in the pension,121 and that the trial court 
could only divide the present value of the pension, not the potential 
future value.122  The court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s 
decision.123  The Ohio Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case 
for a re-determination of the wife’s proper share of the GM pension.124  
The Ohio Supreme Court held that the wife was entitled to a 
survivorship benefit and that the unmatured “Pension Plan A” could be 
divided and a share awarded to the wife.125  The importance of the Hoyt 
decision was not the reversal or remand of the trial court’s decision, but 
the amount of discretion the Ohio Supreme Court gave the trial court in 
awarding a QDRO.  The Ohio Supreme Court held that a trial court 
could take into account any circumstances of the case, status of the 
parties, or term of the pension when dividing a pension plan.126  Any 
pension earned during the marriage was held to be marital property and 
could be used in property division or as alimony.127  Although the court 
held that a QDRO providing specific information and instruction to the 
 
 117. Hoyt v. Hoyt, 559 N.E.2d 1292, 1294-95 (Ohio 1990). 
 118. Hoyt v. Hoyt, C.A. No. 4365, 1988 Ohio App. LEXIS 4685, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. 1988) 
rev’d, 559 N.E.2d 1292 (Ohio 1990). 
 119. Id. at *1-2. 
 120. Id. at *1. 
 121. Id. at *5-6. 
 122. Id. at *2.  General Motors offered two types of pension plans, Plan A and Plan B.  Hoyt, 
1998 Ohio App. LEXIS 4685 at *2.  Plan A did not mature until after 30 years of service and the 
husband only had 20 years of service at the time of divorce, so the present value of Plan A was $0.  
Id. at *2-4.  Plan B was a pension in which the employee could contribute to his or her own pension.  
Id. at *2.  The husband had a total of $439 in the Plan B, and he claimed that this was the only 
amount that the trial court could divide and give to his ex-wife.  Id. at *2-3. 
 123. Id. at *9. 
 124. Hoyt v. Hoyt, 559 N.E.2d 1292, 1300 (Ohio 1990). 
 125. Id. at 1298-99. 
 126. Id. at 1295 (“[T]his court holds that when considering a fair and equitable distribution of 
pension or retirement benefits in a divorce, the trial court must apply its discretion based upon the 
circumstances of the case, the status of the parties, the nature, terms and conditions of the pension or 
retirement plan, and the reasonableness of the result . . . .”).  
 127. Id. at 1294-95.  
20
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plan administrator128 was the only method of dividing the pension under 
REA,129 there were alternatives to an REA pension division.130  These 
alternatives include “an immediate offset or a current assignment of 
proportionate shares, with either a current distribution or a deferred 
distribution.”131  Thus, it is the court’s responsibility to value a pension 
plan and either draft a QDRO to equitably distribute the asset or 
proportionally distribute other assets to compensate for the pension.132  
The Ohio Supreme Court used the Hoyt decision not only to expand on 
the discretion a trial court could use in drafting a QDRO, but also to 
allow for the “equitable division” of a pension by using other marital 
assets, bypassing the QDRO altogether.133 
Ohio courts expanded their discretion further in the case of Clay v. 
Clay.134  In 2007, the Ohio Seventh Appellate District held in Clay that a 
divorce decree ordering the husband to pay his ex-wife $9,975 out of his 
401(k) plan was a valid order despite the fact that a QDRO was not 
prepared.135  Although the court went on to state that a divorce decree is 
not a substitute for a QDRO when it comes to a waiver of rights to an 
ex-spouse’s pension,136 the court still upheld the division of the 
husband’s pension without a QDRO.137  The appellate court claimed the 
payment to the wife was a payment from the husband and not the 
pension plan administrator, taking it outside of the realm of ERISA.138  
The court stated that a QDRO was merely a tool to be used by the 
divorce court and that the QDRO could be avoided by using other 
 
 128. Id. at 1296 (“The QDRO must be drafted to include very specific information with 
explicit instructions to the plan administrator.  It is then the responsibility of the plan administrator 
to review the order of the trial court and determine whether it constitutes a QDRO . . . .”).  
 129. Hoyt v. Hoyt, 559 N.E.2d 1292, 1297 (Ohio 1990).  
 130. Id. 
 131. Id.  The court cautioned, however, “that the trial court cannot violate the terms of the plan 
when fashioning a division of the asset.” Id.  
 132. Id. at 1298-99 (stating that it is the court’s responsibility to value the pension plan, not the 
plan administrator’s, and to equitably divide the pension so that both parties receive the most 
benefit).  See also Straub, supra note 1, at 916 (discussing the equitable distribution method of 
property division that Ohio courts use). 
 133. Id. at 179. 
 134. Clay v. Clay, No. 06 BE 40, 2007 WL 2582211 (Ohio Ct. App. 2007). 
 135. Id. at *4 (“The divorce decree specifically ordered Darvin [ex-husband], and not the 
pension plan administrator, to make the arrangement for the payment of $9,975 to Linda [ex-wife] 
from his 401(k) plan.  The record does not indicate a need for a QDRO in this case, since Darvin, 
and not the 401(k) plan administrator was ordered to make this payment . . . .”). 
 136. Id. at *8.  The court was referring to an argument made by the husband’s second wife that 
the ex-wife waived any right to her ex-husband’s pension when she divorced him, an argument the 
appellate court rejected.  Id. 
 137. Id. at *4.   
 138. Id. 
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marital assets.139  Apparently, the court viewed the funds obtained by the 
husband through the 401(k) plan as “other marital assets” and not part of 
a pension plan regulated by ERISA.140  This ruling is in stark contrast to 
the Supreme Court’s ruling in Boggs in which Mr. Boggs rolled over his 
pension plan into a 401(k) plan that ERISA did not govern, yet the Court 
held that ERISA still applied to the 401(k) funds.141 
These cases demonstrate the view that a QDRO is an important 
aspect of a divorce, although it may not be a necessary one.  When it is 
determined that the parties need a QDRO, the issue of when an ex-
spouse can appeal the divorce decree becomes relevant. 
III.  APPEALING A DIVORCE DECREE   
A.  Appealable Orders  
In order for an appellate court to have jurisdiction over an appeal, 
the trial court must have issued a final order.142  In Ohio, a final order is 
defined by Ohio Revised Code § 2505.02(B).143  If a trial court’s order 
 
 139. Clay v. Clay, No. 06 BE 40, 2007 WL 2582211, at *4 (Ohio Ct. App. 2007) (“A domestic 
relations court, though, is not required to use a QDRO in a divorce whenever the marital assets 
include a pension.  The QDRO is a tool available to the trial court to order the administrator of the 
pension plan to actually redirect benefits to another payee, if that is necessary as part of the divorce.  
The trial court may avoid using a QDRO by designating other marital assets to offset the value of 
the pension, or by requiring one party to pay the equivalent value of those benefits or assets to the 
other party, rather than by requiring the pension plan administrator to pay an alternate payee . . . . 
trial courts have a number of ways to effectuate the division of pension benefits in a divorce other 
than using a QDRO . . . .”). 
 140. Id. at *1.  The husband was ordered by the trial court not just to pay his ex-wife $9,975, 
but to pay the amount “from his 401(k) retirement fund within 30 days of the divorce.”  Id.  The 
original divorce decree stated, “Darvin is ordered to have his 401(K) make the appropriate payment 
to Linda pursuant to this order within 30 days of Judge Sargus’ final Judgment Entry, Decree of 
Divorce.”  Id.  
 141. Supra note 114. 
 142. Wohleber v. Wohleber, No. 06CA009018, 2007 WL 2229284, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. 
2007); Gehm v. Timberline Post & Frame, 861 N.E.2d 519, 522 (Ohio 2007).  “Under Section 
3(B)(2), Article IV, Ohio Constitution, courts of appeals have jurisdiction only to ‘affirm, modify, 
or reverse judgments or final orders of the courts of record inferior to the court of appeals within the 
district.’”  Id.  See also Michael L. Buenger, Ohio Appellate Practice Before and After Polikoff: Are 
Things Really All That Much Clearer?, 28 AKRON L. REV. 1, 2-10 (1994) (recounting the unique 
history of the “final order” rule in Ohio and impact that has on rights to appeal). 
 143. Myers v. City of Toledo, 852 N.E.2d 1176, 1178 (Ohio 2006).  See also OHIO REV. CODE 
ANN. § 2505.02 (2007).  It provides:  
(B) An order is a final order that may be reviewed, affirmed, modified, or reversed, with 
or without retrial, when it is one of the following; 
(1) An order that affects a substantial right in an action that in effect 
determines the action and prevents a judgment; 
22
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does not fulfill one of the categories set out in § 2505.02(B) the appeal 
cannot be heard.144  As the Ohio Ninth District Appellate Court has 
stated: 
R.C. 2505.02(B)(1) requires that an order affect a substantial right and 
determine the action or prevent a judgment.  As this Court has 
frequently emphasized, the primary function of a final order or 
judgment is the termination of the case before the court.  This court 
must look to the language employed in the purported judgment entry to 
ascertain whether the trial court’s entry accomplishes that result.  To 
terminate a claim between the parties, the order must contain a 
statement of relief to which the parties are entitled that is sufficiently 
complete so that the parties can enforce their rights and obligations 
through an execution on that judgment.  
 
A final statement of relief reserve[s] no further questions or directions 
for future determination and leaves nothing to be done but to enforce 
by execution what has been determined.  A judgment that leaves issues 
unresolved and contemplates that further action must be taken is not a 
final appealable order.  However, when the remaining issue is 
mechanical and unlikely to produce a second appeal because only a 
ministerial task similar to assessing costs remains, then the order is 
final and appealable.145 
In Ohio, a final appealable order of divorce must address all issues that 
relate to the property division, parental rights, support, and the 
responsibilities of the parties.146  Therefore, a divorce decree must not 
 
(2) An order that affects a substantial right made in a special proceeding or 
upon a summary application in an action after judgment; 
(3) An order that vacates or sets aside a judgment or grants a new trial; 
(4) An order that grants or denies a provisional remedy and to which both of 
the following apply: 
 (a) The order in effect determines the action with respect to the 
provisional remedy and prevents a judgment in the action in favor of the 
appealing party with respect to the provisional remedy. 
 (b) The appealing party would not be afforded a meaningful or 
effective remedy by an appeal following final judgment as to all proceedings, 
issues, claims, and parties in the action. 
(5) An order that determines that an action may or may not be maintained as a 
class action; 
*** 
(7) An order in an appropriation proceeding that may be appealed pursuant to 
division (B)(3) of section 163.09 of the Revised Code. 
Id.  
 144. Wenger v. Wenger, No. 05CA0057, 2006 WL 1791171, at*2 (Ohio Ct. App. 2006). 
 145. Id. (citations and quotation marks omitted, emphasis in original). 
 146. Miller v. Miller, No. 2003-P-0065, 2003 WL 22952573, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. 2003). 
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only meet the requirements of § 2505.02(B), but also dispose of any 
additional claims relating to the divorce, unless there is just cause for 
delay.147  For example, a divorce decree that does not provide for an 
equitable division of all the marital property is not a final appealable 
order, even if the trial court deals with all other issues in the decree.148  
Child custody149 and child support150 issues, if applicable to the case, 
must be fully determined.  But the divorce decree is final and appealable 
despite the fact that a trial court retains jurisdiction to modify support151 
or the court allows the parties to motion the court for further action.152  A 
party has thirty days to appeal a divorce decree once that decree 
becomes final and appealable.153 
After the time for appeal has passed, a party may receive relief 
from a divorce decree by filing a motion for Ohio Civil Rule 60(B) 
relief.154  Ohio Civil Rule 60(B)155 allows a party to reopen a closed 
 
 147. In re Nichols, No. 03CA41, 2004 WL 868364, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. 2004).  See also OHIO 
CIV.R. 75(F) (2007) (stating, for purposes of OHIO CIV.R. 54(B), that a domestic relations court 
shall not enter a final order for divorce unless: the judgment deals with all matters of property 
division, spousal support, and parental rights and responsibilities; or those claims were settled by 
previous orders and incorporated into the divorce decree; or the judgment expressly determines that 
the court lacks jurisdiction to issue such an order or it is untimely to issue such an order); OHIO 
CIV.R. 54(B) (2007) (stating that unless there is a determination that there is a just reason for delay, 
any judgment that does not dispose of all claims or rights of all parties is not a final appealable 
order). 
 148. Reed v. Reed, No. 14-03-43, 2004 WL 1488861, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. 2004); Scott v. 
Scott, No. 2002-T-0185, 2005 Ohio App. LEXIS 974, at *6-7 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005).  
 149. Salisbury v. Salisbury, Nos. 2005-P-001 & 2005-P-0084, 2006 WL 1882298, at *8 & n. 1 
(Ohio Ct. App. 2006). 
 150. Atkinson v. Atkinson, 856 N.E.2d 1023, 1025-26 (Ohio Ct. App. 2006). 
 151. CSEA ex rel. Spencer v. Gatten, No. 89398, 2007 WL 2269693, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. 
2007) (stating that, although the trial court retained jurisdiction for further action, an order was final 
and appealable and that, “Ohio courts have long recognized that a court retains continuing 
jurisdiction over its orders concerning the custody, care, and support of children”).  
 152. Ortiz v. Ortiz, No. 05 JE 6, 2006 WL 1851730, at *5 (Ohio Ct. App. 2006).  The trial 
court did not value marital property contained in a storage bin.  Id. at *4.  The trial court’s order was 
determined to be final and appealable despite the non-valuation of marital property because the trial 
court always retained jurisdiction to enforce its order and provide for proper distribution of the 
items in the storage unit.  Id. at *5.  The court stated: 
A court always retains jurisdiction to enforce its orders.  As Appellee points out, this is 
normally done through the filing of a contempt of court motion.  The divorce decree is 
not interlocutory and nonappealable simply because the court “reserved” jurisdiction to 
enforce the order, since the authority to enforce this order is inherent in the order itself. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 153. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2505.07 (2007); OHIO APP. R. 4 (2008); Thompson v. Thompson, 
No. 1156, 1975 Ohio App. LEXIS 7194, at *2-3 (Ohio Ct. App. 1975). 
 154. See e.g. El-Tatawy v. El-Tatawy, No. L-02-1235, 2003 WL 22739938, at *3 (Ohio Ct. 
App. 2003); Rainieri v. Rainieri, No. 2004-P-0017, 2005 WL 1713546, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005); 
Lambert v. Lambert, No. F-05-002, 2005 WL 3093449, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005); Smith v. Smith, 
No. 9-06-41, 2007 WL 730234, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. 2007).  
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case, if it meets certain criteria.  A court can reopen a case within one 
year from the date of judgment if there is newly discovered evidence, 
fraud, or mistake.156  A party may motion to have a case reopened under 
60(B) more than a year after a court closes the case, if there is a “reason 
justifying relief from the judgment”157 and the party makes the motion 
within a reasonable time.158  But Rule 60(B) is not a substitute for an 
appeal.159  A motion for Rule 60(B) relief is limited to the situations 
specifically mentioned and not for general review.160 
 
 155. OHIO CIV.R. 60 (2007).  It provides:  
(B) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evidence; fraud; etc. 
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or his legal 
representative from a final judgment, order or proceeding for the following reasons:  (1) 
mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence 
which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial 
under Rule 59(B); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), 
misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the judgment has been 
satisfied, released or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been 
reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have 
prospective application; or (5) any other reason justifying relief from the judgment.  The 
motion shall be made within a reasonable time, and for reasons (1), (2) and (3) not more 
than one year after the judgment, order or proceeding was entered or taken.  A motion 
under this subdivision (B) does not affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its 
operation. 
Id.  
 156. Id.  See also Brown v. Brown, No. 07AP-144, 2007 WL 2327072, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. 
2007).  
 157. OHIO CIV.R. 60(B) (2007); Brown, 2007 WL 2327072 at *1. 
 158. OHIO CIV.R. 60(B) (2007).  See also Hardesty v. Hardesty, Nos. 2004-G-2582 & 2005-G-
2614, 2006 WL 3059849, at *8 (Ohio Ct. App. 2006).  In considering a Rule 60(B) motion with 
regards to an undisclosed pension plan, the court stated: 
In considering Rule 60(B) motions pertaining to this type of alleged error, courts should 
consider the following factors: “what caused the delay in making the motion; whether 
the delay was reasonable; what personal knowledge the movant had about the nature, 
extent and value of all the marital assets (whether included or omitted); what the movant 
should have known about them in the exercise of ordinary care; whether the movant 
expressly or implicitly concurred in the property provisions of the separation agreement; 
what deceptions, if any, were used by the other spouse; and what has intervened between 
the decree and the motion (such as, remarriage of either spouse or both spouses). 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 159. Key v. Mitchell, 689 N.E. 2d 548, 549 (Ohio 1998). 
 160. Wilson v. Wilson, No. 86817, 2006 WL 2373409 at*1 (Ohio Ct. App. 2006) (“In order to 
prevail on a Civ. R. 60(B) motion, the movant must demonstrate that: 1) she has a meritorious claim 
or defense; 2) she is entitled to relief under one of the grounds stated in Civ. R. 60(B)(1) through 
(5); and 3) the motion is made within a reasonable time.” (quoting GTE Automatic Electric, Inc. v. 
ARC Industries, 351 N.E.2d 113, 115 -16 (Ohio 1976))).  See also Forman v. Forman, No. 9-06-63, 
2007 WL 2757630, at *4 (Ohio Ct. App. 2007) (stating that Rule 60(B) can only be used for final 
orders and that a party may only file a motion to reconsider for any non-final or interlocutory order). 
25
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B.  Ohio’s Split on QDROs 
 The procedure for appealing a divorce that requires a QDRO is no 
different from any other court order.161  The QDRO must be a final order 
before the divorce is appealable162 and Ohio Civil Rule 60(B) can only 
be used in limited circumstances.163  Before Wilson, however, there was 
an issue of when a divorce decree requiring a QDRO became a final 
order, thereby allowing the parties to appeal the divorce decree as well 
as the QDRO.164  The appellate courts have split165 on whether a divorce 
decree could be appealed after the trial court set out the conditions that 
the QDRO must meet, but before the QDRO was actually approved by 
the pension plan administrator and filed with the divorce decree.   
A majority of appellate districts in Ohio followed the rule that the 
divorce decree and the QDRO were not final appealable orders until the 
pension plan administrator had approved the QDRO, and the court 
entered the QDRO as part of the divorce decree.166  The Sixth District 
 
 161. Southworth v. Southworth, No. 80704, 2003 WL 23116, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. 2003) 
(stating the standards for relief under Ohio Rule of Civil Procedure 60(B) in the case of a QDRO). 
 162. Lamb v. Lamb, No. 11-98-09, 1998 Ohio App. LEXIS 6007, at *4-5 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998) 
(dismissing an appeal from a QDRO because the QDRO was not signed and was not itself a final 
appealable order).   
 163. See, e.g. Hamlin v. Hamlin, No. 1629, 2004 WL 1178754, at *5 (Ohio Ct. App. 2004) 
(dismissing a ground for appeal of a QDRO because the time to file a Rule 60(B)(1)-(4) motion had 
expired, and Rule 60(B)(5) could not be used to open a case after one year if based on a ground that 
would have relied on Rule 60(B)(1)-(4) if it had been filed within one year from the close of the 
case); Stetler v. Stetler, No. 15-05-16, 2006 WL 1459768, at *1-2 (Ohio Ct. App. 2006) (ruling that 
the passing of sixteen years was too long to file a Rule 60(B) motion to reopen a case in order to 
divide an ex-husband’s pension).  See also supra note 160. 
 164. See infra notes 166-173 and accompanying text.   
 165. See infra notes 166 & 174. 
 166. Lyddy v. Lyddy, 582 N.E.2d 37, 37-38 (Ohio Ct. App.-6th 1989) (stating that after three 
attempts to file a QDRO, the pension plan administrator finally approved the third QDRO and that 
the divorce decree issued twenty-one months earlier was most likely not appealable until the QDRO 
was filed); Chasko v. Chasko, No. 88949, 2007 WL 2955585, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App.-8th 2007) 
(stating in dicta that the court had jurisdiction to hear the appeal because the QDRO for the 
husband’s pension had been entered); Musci v. Musci, No. 23088, 2006 WL 3208558, at *2 (Ohio 
Ct. App.-9th 2006); Hyder v. Hyder, No. 06CA0014, 2006 WL 2864115, at *7 & n.1 (Ohio Ct. 
App.-9th 2006) (mentioning in a footnote that the court had jurisdiction to hear the appeal because 
no QDRO was ordered to be filed, not that a QDRO was missing); Green v. Green, No. 04AP-61, 
2005 WL 468234, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App.-10th 2005) (“However, it is well-established that a 
judgment apportioning pension benefits between ex-spouses is not a final appealable order until 
such time as a qualified domestic relations order (“QDRO”) or DOPO is entered.”); Streza v. Streza, 
No. 05CA008644, 2006 WL 709056, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App.-9th 2006) (stating that the court could 
hear the appeal only because the trial court had issued a final QDRO); Bucalo v. Bucalo, No. 
05CA0011-M, 2005 WL 3193851, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App.-9th 2005) (stating that the original appeal 
for the case at bar was dismissed for lack of a filed QDRO, therefore there was no final appealable 
order); Vujovic v. Vujovic, No. 04CA0083-M, 2005 WL 1819527, at*1 (Ohio Ct. App.-9th 2005) 
(recounting the prior appeal that was dismissed for lack of a final appealable order because a QDRO 
26
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Court of Appeals for Ohio stated that, “a clear majority of Ohio 
appellate courts have consistently held that divorce orders are not final 
and appealable if a QDRO has been ordered but not prepared.”167  These 
courts viewed the QDRO as subject to change up until the time the court 
entered the QDRO into the divorce decree.168  Since the QDRO affected 
a substantial right169 of the parties and was subject to change,170 the 
 
had not been filed and allowing the current appeal to go forward because the parties had filed a 
QDRO); Cooper v. Cooper, No. 84652, 2005 WL 376608, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App.-8th 2005) (“A 
judgment apportioning pension benefits between ex-spouses is not a final order until a Qualified 
Domestic Relations Order (“QDRO”) is entered that disposes of all the retirement benefits.”); Stare 
v. Stare, No. 03-CA-109, 2004 WL 2004152, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App.-5th 2004) (“[T]he decree in the 
case sub judice was not a final appealable order, as the parties’ property division was not complete 
until the issuance of a COAP/QDRO, as is called for in the decree.”); Batt v. Batt, Nos. 82740 & 
83452, 2004 WL 717373, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App.-8th 2004); Keith v. Keith, No. L-04-1011, 2004 WL 
541077, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App.-6th 2004); Sabo v. Sabo, No. 03CA008245, 2003 WL 22900633, at 
*1 (Ohio Ct. App.-9th 2003) (stating the trial court’s order became final and appealable upon the 
journalizing of the QDRO); Rash v. Rash, 799 N.E.2d 226, 228 (Ohio Ct. App.-6th 2003) (reciting 
the courts that have held a divorce decree to not be final until a QDRO was entered); Coutcher v. 
Coutcher, No. L-02-1054, 2003 WL 397760, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App.-6th 2003); Huffman v. Huffman, 
Nos. 00CA704 & 01CA709, 2001 Ohio App. LEXIS 4919, at *4-5 & n.1 (Ohio Ct. App.-4th 2001) 
(stating that QDROs issued eleven months apart were both final appealable orders subject to 
appeal); Peters v. Peters, No. 18445, 2001 Ohio App. LEXIS 672, at *3-4 (Ohio Ct. App.-2d 2001) 
(stating that a previous appeal had been dismissed because the court-ordered QDRO had not been 
filed); Bohl v. Bohl, No. 98CA007276, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 2289, at *2-3 (Ohio Ct. App.-9th 
2000) (declining jurisdiction to hear an appeal because a QDRO had not been filed and therefore no 
final appealable order existed); Procuniar v. Procuniar, No. 95-CA-19, 1995 Ohio App. LEXIS 
3929, at *5-6 (Ohio Ct. App.-2d 1995) (allowing an appeal to go forward because it was filed within 
a timely period after the QDRO was filed, although not within a timely period after the divorce 
decree was entered); Middendorf v. Middendorf, No. 17-93-17, 1994 Ohio App. LEXIS 2550, at 
*2-3 (Ohio Ct. App.-3d 1994) (dismissing an appeal for lack of final appealable order due to the fact 
the trial court did not issue a complete division of marital property, including the issuance of a 
QDRO); Scott v. Scott, No. 1-99-79, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 808, at *4-5 (Ohio Ct. App.-3rd 2000) 
(“A review of the case law reveals the general consensus that a judgment apportioning pension 
benefits between ex-spouses is not a final and appealable order until such time as the QDRO is 
entered.”); Kofol v. Kofol, No. 74191, 1999 Ohio App. LEXIS 2726, at *1-2 (Ohio Ct. App.-8th 
1999); Isaacson v. Isaacson, No. WD-01-030, 2002 Ohio App. LEXIS 750, at *3-5 (Ohio Ct. App.-
6th 2002) (dismissing an appeal so that the trial court could enter a QDRO). 
 167. Keith, 2004 WL 651077 at *1. 
 168. Scott, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 808, at *6 (“We pause to note that until the QDRO is 
entered, the trial judge can change his mind about its contents and that of the judgment ordering it.  
Additionally, as conceded by Appellant’s counsel at oral argument, until a QDRO is entered and 
issued to the plan administrator, there can be no certainty that the plan division will be rejected.  In 
our view, these considerations strengthen our conclusion that until a QDRO is issued the judgment 
entry is not a final and appealable order.”).  
 169. Id. at *4-5 (“A review of the case law reveals the general consensus that a judgment 
apportioning pension benefits between ex-spouses is not a final and appealable order until such time 
as the QDRO is entered. The [rationales] underlying this line of cases is that a “substantial right” 
has not been affected.  In other words, until a QDRO is issued, there is no actual order to the 
pension plan administrator directing it to divide the benefits in a certain manner and, therefore, the 
spouses are unable to determine, with certainty, exactly how their respective rights will be affected.  
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appellate courts would not allow an appeal until the domestic disputes 
court finalized the QDRO and made it a part of the divorce decree.171  
The fact that a substantial right of the parties was not determined 
mandated that the appellate courts lacked jurisdiction to hear an 
appeal.172  Any change the trial court made to a QDRO could render an 
appellate court decision moot by making property division fair or 
rectifying a mistake the appellate court sought to correct.  Therefore, the 
majority of appellate courts refused to hear an appeal on any aspect of 
the divorce decree unless the court-ordered QDRO had pension plan 
approval and the court entered it into the decree.173 
A minority of Ohio appellate districts held that the divorce decree 
was appealable before the pension plan administrator approved the 
QDRO and entered it into the record.174  These courts took the position 
that the right to appeal should not wait on a disinterested third party to 
 
The bottom line is that there is more to be done in the trial court, that being the issuance of a QDRO 
made in compliance with federal law.  Consequently, until the QDRO is issued, the judgment of the 
trial court cannot be considered final and appealable because it cannot be said to yet affect a 
substantial right.”). 
 170. Keith, 2004 WL 541077, at *1 (finding that the trial court’s divorce decree was not final 
because a QDRO was ordered on the condition “if” a pension plan exists, creating the possibility 
that not all the marital property was divided); see also Green, 2005 WL 468234, at *2 (“Divorce is a 
“special statutory proceeding” and, therefore, all ancillary issues related thereto must be analyzed as 
a special proceeding under R.C. 2505.02(B)(2). Therefore, because the division of marital property, 
including pension benefits, is clearly an ancillary issue in a divorce proceeding, the judgment of the 
trial court is final and appealable so long as it affects a “substantial right.”).  The Green court went 
on to find that the divorce decree did not affect a substantial right because the QDRO had not been 
entered by the court.  Id. 
 171. Cooper, 2005 WL 376608, at *1 (“This court has jurisdiction to ‘review, affirm, modify, 
set aside, or reverse judgments or final orders.’  A judgment apportioning pension benefits between 
ex-spouses is not a final order until a Qualified Domestic Relations Order (“QDRO”) is entered that 
disposes of all the retirement benefits.”).  The Cooper court went on to dismiss the appeal because 
the court-ordered QDRO was not entered prior to the appeal.  Id. at *1. 
 172. Green v. Green, No. 05AP-484, 2006 WL 1391079, at *1-2 (Ohio Ct. App. 2006) (“In 
Ohio, appellate courts have jurisdiction over final orders from courts within their appellate districts.  
However, if an order from a lower court within an appellate district is not final, then an Ohio 
appellate court does not have jurisdiction to review the matter, and, as a consequence, the matter 
must be dismissed. ‘[B]ecause the division of marital property, including pension benefits, is clearly 
an ancillary issue in a divorce proceeding, the judgment of the trial court is final and appealable so 
long as it affects a “substantial right.’’’”). 
 173. See supra notes 166 & 171. 
 174. Derrit v. Derrit, 836 N.E.2d 39, 43 (Ohio Ct. App.-11th 2005); Wylie v. Wylie, No. 
95CA18, 1996 Ohio App. LEXIS 2341, at *16 & n.1 (Ohio Ct. App.-4th 1996) (Fourth Appellate 
District) (affirming the trial court’s distribution of marital assets where the assets included an 
ERISA-exempt governmental pension, despite the trial court’s failure to issue a “court order to the 
applicable governmental agency directing . . . payment to appellee from appellant’s retirement 
benefits”); Wright v. Wright, No. 94CA02, 1994 Ohio App. LEXIS 5207, at *6-8 (Ohio Ct. App.-
4th 1994), overruled in part by Liming v. Liming, No. 05CA3, 2005 Ohio App. LEXIS 2109, at *5-
6 (Ohio Ct. App. 4th 2005). 
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approve what the court had ordered.175  The Eleventh Appellate District 
stated: 
This court has decided to overrule appellant’s motion to dismiss and 
hold that the divorce decree is a final appealable order, despite the 
absence of a QDRO. 
 
In support of this decision, we feel it impractical to withhold a party’s 
right to appeal as they are awaiting the actions of non-parties to divide 
retirement benefits and to draft a proper QDRO.  It is inherent that the 
court, so long as it had directed in its judgment entry and finding of 
facts how the pension/retirement assets [sic] are to be divided, may 
sign and execute the QDRO.  Furthermore, in the event that the 
retirement asset cannot be divided consistently with the judgment 
entry, the court, pursuant to a properly filed Civ. R. 60(B) motion may 
subsequently correct said entry consistent with the plan requirements 
or applicable law.176 
The Eleventh District adopted a method of allowing appeals without a 
QDRO as long as the divorce decree described how the parties were to 
draft the QDRO and divide the retirement funds.177  This is important in 
matters of divorce when parties need to litigate important issues such as 
child custody and spousal support178 while the QDRO could take years 
to draft.179  If the subsequently entered QDRO contained an error or was 
not the version that the court had ordered, the Eleventh District proposed 
the parties use Ohio Rule 60(B) to reopen the case and adjust the QDRO 
to comply with the court order.180   
The Second and Fourth Appellate Districts have also allowed pre-
QDRO appeals.  In Wright v. Wright, the Fourth District allowed an 
appeal without a QDRO because the case would otherwise never become 
appealable.181  The parties in that case had never filed the court-ordered 
 
 175. Derrit, 836 N.E.2d 39 at 43.  
 176. Id.  
 177. Id. 
 178. Stackhouse v. Stackhouse, No. 15710, 1996 Ohio App. LEXIS 4853, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. 
1996) (“In divorce proceedings, particularly as such proceedings relate to custody matters, the need 
for immediate review sometimes outweighs the harm caused by piecemeal appeals . . .”). 
 179. See e.g. Lyddy v. Lyddy, 582 N.E.2d 37, 37-38 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989) (taking twenty-one 
months to approve a QDRO).  See also supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.  
 180. Derrit, 836 N.E.2d 39 at 43.  
 181. Wright, 1994 Ohio App. LEXIS 5207, at *4-9.  The trial court had ordered a QDRO, but 
the parties had not filed one.  Id. at 4.  The appellate court acknowledged the fact that other districts 
had ruled that “a judgment apportioning pension benefits between ex-spouses was not final and 
appealable until such time as the QDRO was entered.”  Id. at *5 (citing Lyddy v. Lyddy, 582 N.E.2d 
37 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989)).  The Wright court relied on the Ohio Supreme Court’s decision in State 
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QDRO.182  The Second District, in Tarbert v. Tarbert, took the position 
that a QDRO could not modify a court order, “because the order in 
which it was granted has since become final.”183  This view was directly 
opposed to the majority view, which saw the QDRO as a method of 
adjusting the property division up until the time of entry.184  Although 
Tarbert was an appeal from contempt charges,185 the court seemed to 
endorse the idea that the court order was final and appealable without a 
QDRO.186 
The Ohio Supreme Court resolved the split between appellate 
districts in the fall of 2007, after the court granted review of Wilson v. 
Wilson.187 
IV.  WILSON V. WILSON 
On July 19, 2005, the Wayne County Court of Common Pleas 
issued a divorce decree for Douglas and Jennifer Wilson.188  The 
 
ex rel. Papp v. James, 632 N.E.2d 889 (Ohio 1994), in which the court determined that divorce was 
a “special statutory proceeding” and that “all ancillary issues related thereto must be analyzed as a 
special proceeding under R.C. 2505.02.”  Id. at 7.  The Wright court determined that the division of 
marital property was an ancillary issue in a divorce proceeding and that the trial court’s judgment 
was final and appealable as long as it affected a substantial right.  Id.  The court held that the trial 
court’s order determined a substantial right, and that the “judgment entered below is final and 
appealable (even in the absence of a QDRO).”  Id. at 7-8.  Wright was overruled by Liming v. 
Liming, No. 05CA3, 2005 WL 1056263, at *5-6 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005) which relied on Ohio Civil 
Rule 75(F), adopted after Wright had been decided.  See also Merit Brief of Appellant at 4-5, 
Wilson v. Wilson, 2007 WL 927609 (Ohio 2007) (No. 2006-1814) (hereinafter “Appellant Brief”) 
(explaining the circumstances in which Liming overruled Wright).  Interestingly, the Second District 
in Procuniar v. Procuniar, No. 95-CA-19, 1995 Ohio App. LEXIS 3929 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995), 
relied on the same Ohio Supreme Court Case (Papp) to arrive at an opposite result and denied an 
appeal before the court entered a QDRO.  Procuniary at *5-6. 
 182. Wright, 1994 Ohio App. LEXIS 5207, at *4.   
 183. Tarbert v. Tarbert, No. 96-CA-0036, 1996 Ohio App. LEXIS 4328, at *5 (Ohio Ct. App. 
1996).  The court stated that the QDRO was made “merely in aid of the relief that it granted.”  Id.  
“Those orders may not vary from, enlarge, or diminish the relief that the court granted, because the 
order in which it was granted has since become final.”  Id.  
 184. See supra note 168 and accompanying text. 
 185. Tarbert, 1996 Ohio App. LEXIS 4328, at *1.  Tarbert involved a contempt proceeding in 
which the former husband refused to sign a QDRO dividing his pension with his former wife.  Id.  
The ex-wife’s contempt charges were dismissed by the trial court and the appellate court affirmed.  
Id. at 6.   
 186. Id. at 6 (“At this stage, the court’s power is limited to ordering a QDRO consistent with its 
prior order, as an adjunct to and in aid of the relief it granted in that prior order.”).  
 187. Wilson v. Wilson, 878 N.E.2d 16, 16 (Ohio 2007). 
 188. Wilson v. Wilson, No. 05CA0078, 2006 WL 2336871, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. 2006), rev’d 
by Wilson v. Wilson, 878 N.E.2d 16 (Ohio 2007). 
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Wilsons had been married for ten and a half years.189  During the 
marriage, Douglas Wilson was a member of the Teamsters Union and 
had participated in a pension plan.190  However, Mr. Wilson had only 
participated in the pension plan for three years before he was 
permanently laid off.191  In order for the Teamsters pension to vest, Mr. 
Wilson had to participate in the plan for five years.192  The trial court 
divided the unvested193  Teamsters pension plan194 by issuing the 
following order: 
[Jennifer Wilson] shall receive one-half of the coverture value of 
[Douglas Wilson’s] unvested Teamsters pension if and when it 
becomes vested.  This division shall be through a qualified domestic 
relations order (QDRO) prepared and signed at the time of the vesting.  
The cost of the preparation of the QDRO shall be equally shared 
between the parties.195 
Mr. Wilson objected to the Magistrate’s decision, but the court overruled 
his objection and entered the Magistrate’s order as the judgment entry on 
November 1, 2005.196  Mr. Wilson then appealed the judgment entry, 
claiming seven errors committed by the trial court for appellate 
review.197  The Ohio Ninth District Court of Appeals, Wayne County, 
dismissed the appeal due to lack of jurisdiction on August 14, 2006.198  
 
 189. Wilson, 878 N.E.2d at 16 (stating that the Wilsons were married on October 9, 1993 and a 
complaint for divorce was filed on July 20, 2004). 
 190. Appellant Brief, supra note 181, at 1.  
 191. Id.  
 192. Id.  
 193. Charles F. Basil, District of Columbia Survey: The Divisibility of Pension Interests on 
Divorce: The District of Columbia Ups the Ante, 33 CATH. U.L. REV. 1087, 1091 (1984) (“Judicial 
decisions determining the divisibility of rights in a pension plan have focused on the level of vesting 
of the pension interest in deciding whether to include it in marital property.  Accrued pension 
benefits fall into one of three broad categories.  The interest may be vested and matured, vested but 
not matured, or unvested.  If the pension interest is vested and matured, an unconditional right to 
immediate payment exists.  If the interest is vested but not matured, the interest survives discharge 
or voluntary termination of the employment relationship before retirement.  If, however, the interest 
is unvested, it is completely forfeited upon termination of the employment relationship.”). 
 194. Siler v. Siler, No. CA93-10-081, 1994 Ohio App. LEXIS 3266, at *2-3 (Ohio Ct. App. 
1994) (overruling a prior case and holding that a court may divide an unvested pension as marital 
property and retain jurisdiction to distribute the proceeds of the pension if the pension vested).  See 
also Lemon v. Lemon, 537 N.E.2d 246, 249 (Ohio Ct. App. 1988) (holding that an unvested pension 
is marital property subject to property division upon divorce).   
 195. Appellant Brief, supra note 181, at 1 (emphasis added). 
 196. Wilson v. Wilson, No. 05CA0078, 2006 WL 2336871, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. 2006), rev’d 
by Wilson v. Wilson, 878 N.E.2d 16 (Ohio 2007). 
 197. Id.  
 198. Id. (“This Court has further recognized that this Court lacks jurisdiction to review a 
division of marital assets, where the trial court has yet to journalize a Qualified Domestic Relations 
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Because the parties had not entered a QDRO, the appellate court denied 
Mr. Wilson the right to appeal any of his seven claims.199  Although the 
appellate court realized that the parties might never file the QDRO due 
to the “speculative” nature of the pension plan vesting,200 the court 
nonetheless dismissed the appeal.201  The Ohio Ninth District Court of 
Appeals followed the majority view in denying the appeal.202  Mr. 
Wilson appealed that decision. 
The Ohio Supreme Court granted review on December 27, 2006.203  
Both Douglas Wilson204 and Jennifer Wilson205 submitted briefs in 
support of allowing an appeal before the parties filed a QDRO.206  
Quoting Lamb v. Lamb,207 Mr. Wilson argued that the QDRO is not a 
final appealable order, but merely a guide to enforcing the trial court’s 
 
Order (QDRO) ordered by the court to be filed.  Only after the QDRO is journalized does the 
divorce decree become a final, appealable order.  A QDRO has been defined as ‘a current 
distribution of the rights in a retirement account that is payable in the future, when the payee 
retires.’  Accordingly, if the QDRO has not been filed, the parties’ rights have necessarily not been 
fully adjudicated.”). 
 199. Id. at *2 
 200. Wilson, 2006 WL 2336871, at *2 (“In this case, no QDRO has been journalized.  In fact, it 
is merely speculative whether a QDRO may ever be properly journalized, because its filing is 
contingent on whether appellant’s Teamsters pension vests at some time in the future.”).   
 201. Id. at *2 (“By contingently ordering the preparation and signing, and presumably the 
filing and journalization, of the QDRO only upon the speculative happening of an uncertain future 
event, the trial court has failed to dispose of all issues regarding the division of the parties’ marital 
assets . . . . Because no QDRO has been filed, thereby distributing the parties’ current rights in the 
pension, and because the judgment entry disposes of fewer than all the issues in the parties’ divorce, 
this Court does not have jurisdiction to hear the appeal.  Accordingly, this Court dismisses the 
appeal for lack of a final, appealable order.”).  
 202. Id.   
 203. Wilson v. Wilson, 859 N.E.2d 557 (Ohio 2006) (Table). 
 204. Appellant Brief, supra note 181, at 2.  Mr. Douglas Wilson’s brief, filed on March 2, 
2007, contained the following proposition of law:  “A DIVORCE DECREE WHICH PROVIDES 
FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A QUALIFIED DOMESTIC RELATIONS ORDER IS A FINAL 
APPEALABLE ORDER EVEN IF THE QUALIFIED DOMESTIC RELATIONS ORDER HAS 
NOT YET ISSUED.”  Id.   
 205. Merit Brief of Appellee at 3, Wilson v. Wilson, 2007 WL 927609 (Ohio 2007) (No. 2006-
1814) (hereinafter “Appellee Brief”).  Ms. Jennifer Wilson’s brief, filed on March 20, 2007, 
contained the following proposition of law:  “A DIVORCE DECREE WHICH PROVIDES FOR 
THE ISSUANCE OF A QUALIFIED DOMESTIC RELATIONS ORDER IS A FINAL 
APPEALABLE ORDER EVEN IF THE QUALIFIED DOMESTIC RELATIONS ORDER HAS 
NOT YET ISSUED.”  Id.  The brief went on to state, “[t]he Appellee has no direct opposition to the 
assignment of error and proposition of law submitted by the Appellant.”  Id.   
 206. Wilson v. Wilson, 878 N.E.2d 16, 17 (Ohio 2007) (“Although the trial court held that the 
unvested Teamster’s pension is a marital asset, the court of appeals held that it is speculative 
whether a QDRO may ever be properly journalized because its filing is contingent on whether the 
pension vests at some time in the future.  Both parties disagree with this holding.”) (emphasis 
added). 
 207. Lamb v. Lamb, No. 11-98-09, 1998 Ohio App. LEXIS 6007 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998). 
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decision.208  The QDRO itself does not decide the rights of the parties, it 
only “mimics” the order of the court.209  The court, not the QDRO, 
determines the substantial rights of the parties.210   
Arguing that the divorce decree is final and appealable upon filing 
the decree, Mr. Wilson’s brief equates the QDRO to other court-ordered 
filings in divorce cases, such as quitclaim deeds and wage withholding 
orders.211  A court will order a party to execute a quitclaim deed in a 
case where ex-spouses hold joint title to the marital residence.212  Parties 
file a quitclaim deed with the county in order to transfer property, but the 
divorce is final and appealable before filing the quitclaim deed.213  
Courts often use wage garnishment orders for paying child support and 
spousal support.214  The parties, however, are able to appeal a divorce 
decree before they implement the court-ordered wage garnishment.215  
Similar to a QDRO, these filings only execute the court’s order and do 
not constitute “a further adjudication on the merits” of the case.216  A 
QDRO, like the wage garnishment and quitclaim deed, “is merely a tool 
used to facilitate the implementation of the decree of divorce and serves 
no purpose other than to distribute to the parties the pension benefits 
granted to them in the decree.”217 
Mr. Wilson also argued that if the court required the parties to file a 
QDRO before appealing the divorce, the court would in effect deny Mr. 
Wilson’s appeal “ad infinitum.”218  Due to the speculative nature of Mr. 
 
 208. Appellant Brief, supra note 181, at 5. 
 209. Id.  Appellant’s brief quoted the Lamb court: 
[T]he QDRO in this case does not affect a substantial right of the parties in that it merely 
mimics the order of the original divorce decree.  The original divorce decree was the 
order which established the parties[‘] property distribution and provided for an equitable 
pension division.  This is the order which determined the rights of the parties.  The 
QDRO in this case differs in no way from the divorce decree and is itself a ministerial 
tool used by the trial court in order to aid the relief that the court had previously granted. 
Id.  
 210. Id.  
 211. Id. at 10-11. 
 212. Appellant Brief, supra note 181, at 10. 
 213. Id. at 11 (“There has never been a suggestion that a party must await the filing of the deed 
in order to appeal the decree of divorce.”).   
 214. Id.  Once a court orders a wage withholding, the Child Support Enforcement Agency 
(CSEA) must notify the employer to begin withholding wages.  Id.  See also Robert D. Null, Note, 
Tenancy By The Entirety as an Asset Shield: An Unjustified Safe Haven For Delinquent Child 
Support Obligors, 29 Val. U.L. Rev. 1057, 1071-72 (1995) (giving a short explanation of the 
procedures for wage garnishment).  
 215. Appellant Brief, supra note 181, at 11.   
 216. Id.  
 217. Id.   
 218. Id. at 13. 
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Wilson’s pension plan vesting, there was a possibility that Mr. Wilson 
would never have the opportunity to file a QDRO.219  In such a case, the 
court would deny hearing Mr. Wilson’s seven grounds for appeal, six of 
which had nothing to do with his pension.220  Mr. Wilson cited other 
cases in which an Ohio appellate court denied an appeal due to the lack 
of a properly filed QDRO, thereby delaying the adjudication of other 
rights.221   
The Ohio Supreme Court held oral arguments on September 11, 
2007 and issued an opinion on November 20, 2007.222  In a short 
opinion, the court held that “a divorce decree that provides for the 
issuance of a QDRO is a final appealable order, even before the QDRO 
is issued.”223  Siding with the minority, the court reasoned that the 
divorce decree was the final order of the court and that the QDRO was 
merely a tool used to enforce the decree.224  The court stated: 
A QDRO does not in any way constitute a further adjudication on the 
merits of the pension division, as its sole purpose is to implement the 
terms of the divorce decree.  Therefore, it is the decree of divorce that 
constitutes the final determination of the court and determines the 
merits of the case.  After a domestic relations court issues a divorce 
decree, there is nothing further for the court to determine.225 
The court ruled that the decree complies with Ohio Civil Rule 75(F) 
because the decree sets out how the pension plan administrator will 
divide the pension.226  The trial court must determine “the value of the 
pension and the percentage to give to each spouse, which may include . . 
.  expert testimony regarding the value of the unvested pension and the 
correct percentage discount for the time remaining until the pension 
becomes vested.”227  Because the QDRO cannot alter the divorce decree, 
Ohio Civil Rule 75(F) is satisfied upon the filing of the decree.228  The 
 
 219. Id. 
 220. Appellant Brief, supra note 181, at 13. 
 221. Id. at 15-16 (citing Sabo v. Sabo, 2003 Ohio 6586 (Ohio Ct. App. 2003) (wife was 
delayed from appealing non-pension issues for over a year due to the lack of a properly filed 
QDRO), Bucalo v. Bucalo, 2005 Ohio 6319 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005) (appellant had to wait until a 
QDRO was filed in order to appeal five unrelated financial issues), Vujovic v. Vujovic, 2005 Ohio 
3942 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005) (husband appealed the denial of shared parenting, but was denied a 
hearing on appeal due to the lack of a filed QDRO)). 
 222. Wilson v. Wilson, 878 N.E.2d 16, 16 (Ohio 2007).   
 223. Id. at 19. 
 224. Id. (citing Lamb, 1998 Ohio App. LEXIS 6007, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998)). 
 225. Id.  
 226. Id.  
 227. Id.  
 228. Wilson, 878 N.E.2d at 18. 
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court also stated that if the decree was not appealable, the parties might 
never be able to bring an appeal due to the unvested nature of Mr. 
Wilson’s pension.229 
V.  RAMIFICATIONS OF WILSON V. WILSON 
By allowing parties to appeal their substantive claims before they 
file a QDRO, the Ohio Supreme Court has removed a significant delay 
to appealing divorce cases.  QDROs can take months to prepare.230  
During that time, parties may be neglecting the rights of ex-spouses and 
children.231  Much needed support may be awaiting appeal.  By allowing 
a timely appeal, the Wilson decision brings Ohio in line with other states 
that have decided this issue.232   
Forcing the parties to sacrifice other rights to the divorce decree in 
order to preserve the right to a pension is inequitable.  If the parties to a 
divorce decree must wait for a pension plan administrator to draft a 
QDRO in order to appeal other rights, the courts would force the parties 
into a situation in which they must choose between valuable rights.  On 
the one hand, the parties can choose to preserve their right to the other’s 
pension, wait for the filing of the QDRO, and let their rights to child 
support, spousal support, or child custody deteriorate.  On the other 
hand, if the parties wish to pursue their claim for child support or child 
custody on appeal, they may have to agree to forfeit their right to their 
ex-spouse’s pension by giving up any interest in a QDRO in order to 
pursue an appeal.233  This type of situation creates bargaining power that 
 
 229. Id.  See also Wilson v. Wilson, No. 05CA0078, 2008 WL 2580931 (Ohio Ct. App. 2008).  
Upon remand, the court sustained one of Mr. Wilson’s seven assignments of error.  Id. at *6. 
 230. Gendreau v. Gendreau (In re Gendreau), 122 F.3d 815, 819 (9th Cir. 1997) (stating that 
drafting a QDRO is “a process which everyone (including Congress) recognizes as time-
consuming”).  See also 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(H) (2000) (providing an eighteen month time period 
to determine if a DRO is a QDRO).  
 231. See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text. 
 232. See e.g. Holland v. Holland, Record No. 1231-04-3, 2004 WL 2790653, *1 n.1 (Va. App. 
2004) (Virginia); Incontro v. Incontro, No. A-01-1068, 2003 WL 1962884, at *1 (Neb. App. 2004) 
(Nebraska); Prol v. Prol, 935 A.2d 547, 550 (Pa.Super. 2007) (allowing an appeal before the wife 
filed a QDRO); In re Marriage of Davis, 120 Cal.App.4th 1007, 1013-14 (Cal.App. 2d 2004) 
(addressing an appeal prior to the filing of a QDRO); In re Marriage of Ward, 641 N.E.2d 879 (Ill. 
Ct. App. 1994) (allowing multiple appeals from a divorce, some of which occurred before a QDRO 
was filed).  But see also Rohrbeck v. Rohrbeck, 566 A.2d 767,773-74 (Md. Ct. App. 1989) (stating 
that the trial court’s order was not final until the QDRO was denied). 
 233. Goulding v. Goulding, No. 2007-T-0011, 2007 WL 4484781, at *7 (Ohio Ct. App. 2007) 
(parties can agree to the conditions of the QDRO which becomes like a legally binding contract that 
will be carried out on its terms); Unger v. Unger, No. 2003CA00356, 2004 WL 2496435, at *3 
(Ohio Ct. App. 2004) (Boggins, J., dissenting).  “[C]ourts and orders therefrom are not for the 
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favors the spouse with the pension that can be used to force the other 
spouse to not bring a valid claim.  At the extreme, this situation 
mandates that the court forever bar an appeal when the parties might 
never draft a QDRO, as was the case in Wilson.   
But there is also a negative aspect to allowing a pre-QDRO appeal.  
The pension plan administrator must approve the QDRO before the court 
can file it with the divorce decree.234  If the pension plan administrator 
does not approve the court’s determination of the pension division after 
the divorce decree becomes final, the court may have to adjust the 
parties’ property division in order to accommodate a proper QDRO.  
Because the court cannot modify its own property division once it is 
final,235 the losing party may have limited avenues for redress if the prior 
court order is final.236  Another issue arises when the parties agree on a 
QDRO during divorce proceedings.  The QDRO filed with the court may 
not be what the parties agreed to.237  If the parties file a QDRO more 
than thirty days after the divorce decree, the decree is no longer 
appealable.238  The parties could be stuck with a QDRO that unfairly 
favors one spouse.   
 
benefit of themselves . . . judicial orders are not sacrosanct and . . . parties may agree to other 
arrangements.”  Id.  
 234. See supra note 13.  See also Albert Feuer, Who is Entitled to Survivor Benefits From 
ERISA Plans?, 40 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 919, 1000 (2007) (describing the pension plan 
administrator’s obligation to sequester payments subject to a DRO for eighteen months while the 
DRO becomes a QDRO and that the QDRO may be modified due to suggestions by the pension 
plan administrator).  
 235. McGee v. McGee, 860 N.E.2d 1054, 1057 (Ohio Ct. App. 2006) (stating that a court may 
not modify its own property division, yet the parties to the litigation are free to modify the court 
order themselves). 
 236. See e.g. Miller v. Miller, No. 07CA0068-M, 2008 WL 1930784, at *1-2 (Ohio Ct. App. 
2008) (applying Wilson retroactively to deny an appeal); Rothman v. Rothman, No. 07CA009295, 
2008 WL 4116089, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. 2008) (applying the Ohio Supreme Court’s decision in 
Wilson retroactively in order to deny an appeal from a divorce as untimely because the husband 
filed the appeal five months after the trial court entered its judgment, yet only six days after the 
parties filed a QDRO); Poleondakis v. Poleondakis, No.23981, 2008 WL 2267188 (Ohio Ct. App. 
2008); Zorn v. Zorn, No. 07CA0077-M, 2008 WL 2079431 (Ct. App. 2008).  In this case, the Ohio 
Ninth District Court of Appeals denied the wife’s appeal both before and after the Wilson decision, 
the first time for lack of a final appealable order and the second time for lack of jurisdiction.  Id. at 
*3 & n.1.   
 237. Hale v. Hale, No. 21402, 2007 WL 625813, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. 2007).  An independent 
court-appointed pension evaluator drafted a QDRO for the divorcing couple.  Id. at *1.  The ex-
husband attempted to vacate the QDRO because the parties had not agreed to some of the terms of 
the QDRO and some of the terms were never shown to the ex-husband.  Id. at *2. 
 238. A limited number of cases have allowed separate appeals from both the divorce decree 
and the QDRO.  See Pierron v. Pierron, No. 07CA3153, 2008 WL 746948, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. 
2008); Wigel v. Wigel, Nos. 06CA7- & 07CA10, 2008 WL 495896, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. 2008). 
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Courts may also interpret the Wilson decision to eliminate the 
appeal rights of many divorcing couples.  Recently, courts have 
retroactively applied the Wilson decision, denying jurisdiction over 
appeals from divorce decrees that trial courts entered before the Wilson 
decision and months before the parties filed an appeal, but in which the 
parties were waiting for a QDRO.239  In Rothman v. Rothman, the Ohio 
Ninth District Court of Appeals used the Wilson decision to deny 
jurisdiction for an appeal filed before Wilson was decided.240  The court 
denied the parties in Rothman the right to appeal because they relied on 
case law and waited to appeal until they filed a QDRO.   
The timing of appeal for divorce cases and the subsequently filed 
QDRO may also have an effect on bankruptcy law.  Many divorcing 
couples go through bankruptcy prior to, or subsequent to, divorce.241  
The rights to pension benefits in the near future may have an impact on 
the bankruptcy proceedings,242 although Ohio exempts certain pensions 
and IRAs from garnishment or attachment in bankruptcy.243  If a court 
files a QDRO that incorrectly gives a large portion of pension income to 
one spouse, that spouse may become prejudiced in a bankruptcy 
proceeding.244  The spouse must have a way of correcting a QDRO that 
 
 239. See supra note 236. 
 240. Rothman, 2008 WL 4116089, at *1 (“Although Husband filed his notice of appeal one day 
before the Supreme Court issued its decision in Wilson, this Court has determined that the ruling in 
Wilson is applicable both prospectively, and retroactively . . . . Therefore, Wilson is the controlling 
authority in the case at hand.”).   
 241. Jonathan D. Fisher & Angela C. Lyons, Till Debt do us Part: A Model of Divorce and 
Personal Bankruptcy, 4 REV. ECON. HOUSEHOLD 35, 36, 44-45 (2006) (finding that “being recently 
divorced doubles the probability of bankruptcy” and “that filing for bankruptcy almost doubles the 
likelihood of divorce.”).  The authors state: 
Research shows that bankruptcy and divorce are positively correlated, such that the 
unconditional probability of bankruptcy is high after a household becomes divorced. . . . 
There are reasons why divorce may be a likely contributor to bankruptcy: (1) divorce 
imposes high costs on the family (e.g., lawyer fees) causing bankruptcy to become a 
financially viable option or (2) lawyers cross-market products during their counseling 
(i.e., inform the participants of the divorce about the benefits of bankruptcy).  However, 
it may just be the case that the factors that drive the bankruptcy decision are the same 
factors that drive the divorce decision.  
Id. at 36. 
 242. See, e.g. C. Scott Pryor, Rock, Scissors, Paper: ERISA, the Bankruptcy Code and State 
Exemption Laws for Individual Retirement Accounts, 77 AM. BANKR. L.J. 65 (2003) (discussing the 
interaction between ERISA and the Bankruptcy Code exemptions);  Alyson F. Finkelstein, Note & 
Comment, A Tug of War: State Divorce Courts versus Federal Bankruptcy Courts Regarding Debts 
Resulting from Divorce, 18 BANK. DEV. J. 169 (2001); Ottilie Bello, Comment, Bankruptcy and 
Divorce:  The Courts Send a Message to Congress, 13 PACE L. REV. 643 (1993). 
 243. OHIO REV. CODE § 2329.66(A)(10) (2007). 
 244. 11 U.S.C.S. § 707(b) (Lexis 2008) (providing certain debt to income ratio limits to filing a 
Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition).   
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the court files more than thirty days after the divorce decree becomes 
final. 
The courts can easily solve most of these issues by allowing parties 
to re-open their divorce under Ohio Civil Rule 60(B) solely for the 
purposes of adjusting the QDRO.245  Under Ohio Civil Rule 60(B)(5), a 
party to the divorce may motion the court to reopen the case for any 
reason that justifies relief.246  An erroneously entered QDRO would 
certainly qualify as a reason justifying relief.247  The QDRO may have a 
large detrimental effect on the financial stability of one or both spouses 
if it is incorrect.  Additionally, the inaccurate QDRO would not be 
subject to the one-year limitation of Ohio Civil Rule 60(B)248 because it 
is not mistake,249 inadvertence,250 surprise,251 excusable neglect,252 
 
 245. See Derrit v. Derrit, 836 N.E.2d 39, 43 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005) (“Furthermore, in the event 
that the retirement assets cannot be divided consistently with the judgment entry, the court, pursuant 
to a properly filed Civ. R. 60(B) motion may subsequently correct the entry consistent with the plan 
requirements or applicable law.”).  See also Kingery v. Kingery, No. 8-05-02, 2005 WL 1662022, at 
*1-2 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005) (upholding a Rule 60(B) motion to modify a QDRO seven months after a 
final divorce); Borzy v. Borzy, No. 3185-M, 2001 WL 1545676, at *3-4 (Ohio Ct. App. 2001) 
(upholding trial court’s decision to grant appellant’s 60(B)(5) motion).   
 246. OHIO CIV.R. 60(B)(5) (2007) (allowing relief from a judgment or order by any reason 
justifying relief).  See also supra note 155.   
 247. Wilson v. Lee, 876 N.E.2d 1312, 1315 (Ohio Ct. App. 2007) (describing Ohio Civil Rule 
60(B) as, “a ‘remedial rule to be liberally construed so that the ends of justice may be served’”).   
 248. OHIO CIV.R. 60(B) (stating that there is a one year limitation only applies for re-opening a 
case on the grounds of mistake, inadvertence, surprise, excusable neglect, newly discovered 
evidence, or fraud).  See also supra note 155.   
 249. Smith v. Smith, No. 83275, 2004 WL 2361973, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. 2004).  The court set 
forth the standard for Ohio Civil Rule 60(B)(1) relief in a divorce case: 
Typically, courts will grant relief on the basis of mistake when the mistake is a mutual 
mistake shared by both parties as to a material fact in the case.  However, ‘the courts of 
this state have generally held that relief from [a divorce] decree will not be granted when 
the alleged ‘mistake’ was merely a unilateral mistake on the part of one party or her 
counsel.’  In such situations, the party alleging the mistake ‘must show why he was 
justified in failing to avoid mistake or inadvertence; gross carelessness is insufficient.’ 
Id. (citations omitted).  An inaccurate QDRO is not a mutual mistake shared by both parties at the 
time the parties agreed upon the terms of the QDRO.  Rather, the incorrect QDRO is simply a 
wrongly drafted document filed post judgment.   
 250. Wilson, 876 N.E.2d at 1317.  The court quotes Black’s Law Dictionary to define 
‘inadvertence’ for the purposes of Ohio Civil Rule 60(B) as “[h]eedlessness; lack of attention; want 
of care; carelessness; failure of a person to pay careful and prudent attention to * * * a proceeding 
in court by which its rights may be affected.”  Id. (emphasis in original).  Drafting a QDRO that is 
not in conformity with the divorce decree is not due to “lack of attention” or “want of care,” but 
rather, post-decree mistake or drafting error. 
 251. OHIO CIV.R. 60(B)(1) (2007).  
 252. Heard v. Dubose, No. C-060265, 2007 WL 424094, at **3 (Ohio Ct. App. 2007).  The 
court summarized the ‘excusable neglect’ standard of Ohio Civil Rule 60(B) as: 
[c]ourts have defined excusable neglect in the negative, stating that a defendant’s 
inaction is not excusable neglect when it shows ‘a complete disregard for the judicial 
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fraud,253 or newly discovered evidence.254  Nevertheless, the parties 
would have to file the Rule 60(B) motion within a reasonable time from 
the time the court files the QDRO.255  By allowing the parties to appeal 
their divorce decree before filing a QDRO and then allowing them to use 
Ohio Civil Rule 60(B) to correct any mistakes in the QDRO, the courts 
would protect the parties’ rights in the QDRO as well as allow timely 
appeal of other ancillary issues to the divorce.   
The Wilson case correctly allows for a timely appeal from a divorce 
decree, however, it does not address the need for corrective action if the 
QDRO is incorrect.256  Although the QDRO must conform to the 
mandates of a divorce decree,257 parties can differ on the proper 
interpretation.  Parties need a procedure for litigating the accuracy of a 
QDRO entered by the court after the divorce decree is final and the 
period for appeal has ended.  Using Ohio Civil Rule 60(B) is the only 
method of providing that procedure.  The courts, however, should limit 
the issues to modifying the QDRO to conform to the divorce decree.  
Any other issues of the divorce are properly handled on appeal. 
 
system’ or it falls substantially below that which is reasonable under the circumstances.  
A determination of excusable neglect depends on the facts and circumstances of each 
case.  
Id.  An incorrect QDRO is not necessarily a result of neglect.  The QDRO could be incorrect for a 
number of reasons, including an error by the plan administrator.   
 253. Leibold v. Hiddens, No. 21587, 2007 WL 1721347, at *5 (Ohio Ct. App. 2007) (“A claim 
of actual fraud is established by showing a false misrepresentation of fact that is material to the 
transaction made with intent to mislead, and which did, in fact, result in justifiable reliance and 
injury.”).   
 254. Dunham v. Dunham, 870 N.E.2d 168, 188 (Ohio Ct. App. 2007).  The court explains that 
in terms of Ohio Civil Rule 60(B), “[n]ewly discovered evidence refers to evidence in existence at 
the time of trial of which the aggrieved party is excusably ignorant.”  Id.  A subsequently filed 
QDRO is obviously not in existence at the time of a divorce proceeding.  
 255. GTE Automatic Electric, Inc. v. ARC Industries, Inc., 351 N.E.2d 113, 116 (Ohio 1976).  
The Ohio Supreme Court described the standards for bringing a successful Ohio Civil Rule 60(B) 
motion as: 
To prevail on his motion under Civ. R. 60(B), the movant must demonstrate that: (1) the 
party has a meritorious defense or claim to present if relief is granted; (2) the party is 
entitled to relief under one of the grounds stated in Civ. R. 60(B)(1) through (5); and (3) 
the motion is made within a reasonable time, and, where the grounds of relief are Civ. R. 
60(B)(1), (2), or (3), not more than one year after the judgment, order or proceeding was 
entered or taken.   
Id. (emphasis added).  See also supra note 160. 
 256. See generally Wilson v. Wilson, 878 N.E.2d 16 (Ohio 2007). 
 257. Lamb v. Lamb, No. 11-98-09, 1998 Ohio App. LEXIS 6007, at *5-6 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998) 
(“Indeed a QDRO may not vary from, enlarge, or diminish the relief that the court granted in the 
divorce decree, since that order which provided for the QDRO has since become final.”).   
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VI.  CONCLUSION 
Divorces are on the rise in America258 and spouses must find ways 
to disentangle themselves and make a clean break.259  The Ohio Supreme 
Court’s decision in Wilson v. Wilson correctly resolved an important 
issue in Ohio divorce law, thereby facilitating the divorce process.  
Allowing a party to appeal the divorce decree before the parties finalize 
a QDRO is important in preserving the rights of both spouses.  One 
spouse can no longer use the long delay of drafting a QDRO to pressure 
the other spouse into giving up rights or child custody.  The QDRO 
drafting process does not have to be rushed to the detriment of the 
parties in order to appeal an issue that one ex-spouse views as more 
important than the pension plan benefits.  Parties may now freely resolve 
their disputes without waiting for a disinterested pension plan 
administrator to draft an unrelated document.   
The issue of appealing a QDRO, however, is not yet resolved.  If 
the divorce is final and the court enters the QDRO months or years later, 
how do the parties address problems with the QDRO?  The easiest 
solution is for the parties to file an Ohio Civil Rule 60(B) motion to 
reopen the divorce case.  The court can simply limit the motion to 
address the issues of the QDRO, allowing the parties to deal with the 
other issues by appealing the decree.  The result would give the parties 
thirty days to appeal the divorce and the ability to contest the QDRO 
within a reasonable amount of time after the pension plan administrator 
 
 258. Amy C. Henderson, Comment, Meaningful Access to the Courts?: Assessing Self-
Represented Litigants’ Ability to Obtain a Fair, Inexpensive Divorce in Missouri’s Court System, 72 
UMKC L. REV. 571, 572-73 (2003) (“The rate of divorce in the United States has increased 
phenomenally during the last decade.  With the number of divorces quadrupling in less then twenty-
seven years, ‘the United States has the highest divorce rate of any [industrialized] nation in the 
world.’ In 1970, an estimated 4.3 million Americans were divorced.  By 1996, that number had 
soared to 18.3 million.  Additionally, ‘the divorce rate in 1999 was half the rate for marriages in the 
same year.’”).  
 259. Straub, supra note 1, at 916.  Straub explains how Ohio courts approach a divorce case, 
specifically through property division: 
The general view is that marriage is an economic partnership in which both spouses 
contribute, and in such a circumstance, a court will divide marital property equitably 
regardless of each person’s independent monetary or material earnings during the 
marriage.  For example, Ohio courts approach property division through an equitable 
distribution viewpoint, and in doing so, strive to fairly and reasonably divide property 
between the divorcing parties.  In making an equitable distribution of property, Ohio 
courts divide all marital property equally, and then appropriately adjust the division 
under the specific facts of each case.  In sum, divorce courts attempt to end the marriage 
and fairly separate all the assets in order for the parties to live with as few ties to each 
other as possible. 
Id.  
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files it.  Without this option, the parties are subject to being stuck with a 
poorly drafted QDRO that unfairly favors one spouse.   
The courts should also strive to find an equitable solution to those 
appeals that relied on pre-Wilson case law and waited for a QDRO filing 
before appealing.  Courts should not preclude parties from appealing 
when they were merely following the rule of law.  An equitable solution 
may be to allow the parties to appeal once a QDRO is filed or allow an 
appeal within thirty days of the Wilson decision.  For the courts that deal 
with this issue, however, denying an appeal due to justifiable reliance on 
case law is not a fair adjudication of the parties’ rights to appeal. 
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